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PRECOMMITMENT AND MAl'JAGERlAL 
INCENTIV'ES 
CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONALISM: .A1"\JTITAKEOVER 
CHARTER PROVISIONS AS PRECOMMITMENT 
Constitutions constitute a polity and create and entrench power. A COJjJorate 
ronstitution-the governance choices incrnporated in state law and the certifirate 
of incmporation-resemhles a political constitution. Delaware law allows pmties 
to crmte cr)ljJomtions, to endow them with jJnjJelual life, to assign rights and du­
ties to "citizens" (directors and shareholders), to adojJI a great variet_y of govern­
rtnre stnu:lttiFS, and to entrench those choices. In this Artide, we mgue that lhr 
decision to endow directors with signifirant jJower over whether and how to sell the 
comjHmJ is a constitutional choice ofgovernanr:e structure. H� then argue that it 
is, on theoretiral and emfJirical grounds, a perfectly intelligible choice: sharehold­
en JntsonabZv might opt for board entreMhmmt-imjJlemPnted, for Pxarnp!P, by 
means of rt staggnprf board-in ordn to mablP a board to PntfJloy selling strategies 
more effecti·udy and, thus, to inn"Pase the Jnemium slumdwlders receive whrn the 
crnnjJilil)' is sold. Such a rlrcision is a kind of jJrecommit;nPnt whereby sharelwld­
ms, by binding themselves ex antr, ltW)' be ablr to imjJrove thrir co!lrctivP jJosition 
PX jJOSt. 
Aftn exrmzining how sharrlwlden ran rntrench Jmrtirular govnnance struc­
IU!Ps under Delawarr law, WP examine two issues that arise once shareholders 
have chosen to entrench a governance structure: thr question of incomplete im­
jJlemenlation that arises in mses such as Blasius and Liquid Audio; and the 
questions of when and whether changed cin:wnstanres justify ex post judicial ne­
gation of shrrmlwldns 'prior commitments. 
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lNTRODL'CTlON 
Companies, like many other complex assets, are almost always sold 
by negotiation. The hostile tender offer, so beloved by corporate law 
scholars, has never been a major mode for control transactions. This 
Article focuses on three interrelated issues: why rational shareholders, 
aware of the full range of agency costs, might commit to have their 
company sold through a negotiated process controlled by the board; 
how they implement this preference; and how courts or legislatures 
should deal v.rith claims that commitments either have not been prop­
erly implemented or have backfired and should be set aside. "�"such, 
this is an article about "corporate constitutionalism," about the gov­
ernance commitments made by shareholders, and about how Dela­
ware deals with these commitments in a dynamic world. 
A scene from the real world may help frame our argument. In 
1991, when its stock was trading at around $20 per share, Neutrogena, 
the niche soap maker, put itself up for sale.1 Dissatisfied with the in­
terest in the company, CEO and controlling shareholder Lloyd Cotsen 
took Neutrogena off the market and continued to pursue its expan­
sion strategy.� Three years later, when Neutrogena was again put on 
the market, Johnson & Johnson bought it for $35.25 per share.1 
vVrote the New York Times, "Though the price of $35.25 a share, more 
than three times 1993 sales, is high, analysts said Neutrogena 's strong 
brands and its untapped overseas potential were worth the price."
1 
The Neutrogena case is hardly unique. A board may seek the sale 
of a company, find market conditions are not right, pull back, and 
then two or more years later, go to market again and get a ''blow crway" 
price. This can be because economic conditions or industry concli-
. tions have improved, because the business has done better, or because 
buyers have just decided the acquisition is "strategic." Often it is not 
generally known that the company has been up for sale previously. 
VV11at one does hear about, however, are cases in which a hostile 
bidder approaches the company and the board refuses to sell because, 
it says, conditions are not right. These events have generated, and 
continue to generate, substantial controversy. Most of the commen­
tary on hostile takeovers falls in one of tvm broad schools of thought. 
1 Streetwallm, FORBES, Sept. 1 2, 1994, at 288, 289. 
� Cotsen's family owned around forty-fiye percent of Neutrogena's shares. Sallie 
Hofmeister, Johnson lo Acquire Neulmp,-e1w, NY TI\IES, Aug. 23, 1994, at D I. 
:1 !d. 
I frf. 
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The Hamiltonian ·'board veto" school holds that shareholders are not 
well-equipped to make the decisions involved in the sale of the com­
pany and should thus leave these decisions to the board. Believing 
both in the correctness of their views and in the inability of share­
holders to grasp that correctness, board veto proponents are quick to 
call for legal intervention when shareholders are unwilling on their 
own to grant to the board the powers demanded.
-, 
The Jacksonian "shareholder choice" school holds that boards are 
self-interested in responding to hostile bids and that shareholders 
should independently determine whether to accept or reject an offer. 
But most shareholder choice advocates have no deeper commitment 
to shareholder autonomy than do board veto proponents. vVhen 
shareholders consent to rules that enshrine board power, they call for 
legal intervention to set these rules aside.'; 
By contrast, we believe that shareholders should be taken seri­
ously, not only when deciding on an actual bid, but also when setting 
up the rules as to who decides.' When shareholders entrench some 
power in the board (and when they do not)-through a shareholder 
vote or an investment decision ·when a company goes public-courts 
and legislators should presumptively respect that decision. A.s we ar­
gue, neither the theoretical arguments for shareholder choice and 
board veto nor the empirical evidence are strong enough to overcome 
--------- · -·-· ·-- � 
See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and ProfessOI:'i Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1037, 
1000-51-\ (2002) (arguing that hoards should be permitted to block bids that share­
holders want to accept); l'vlartin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Tatge(> BormlmO J/1 , :10 Bcs. 
L\\\·. 101,104 (1979) (same) [hereinafter Lipton, TaheovnBirls]. 
,; 
.\ee, l:'.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The 
Pmonfitl /J.ntitalmmn Forre of s·taggered Boa rds: Theo1y, Evirlmce, and PolirJ, 54 STA:\. L 
REV. 8R7, 9:t9 r:zo02) [hereinafter BC&S] (arguing that shareholders should not be 
permitted to adopt an antitakeoYer device, such as staggered boards, that does notal­
low for a one-time, up-or-clown referendum on acquisition offers); Bernard Black & 
Reinier Kraakman, Delmuare 's Taheovrr Law: J.'he Uncertain S'earch for Hidden Value, SJb 
:\\\'. C. L. REV. 521, 561 (2002) (arguing that courts should not respect staggered 
board terms because "[n]either the finance literature nor the norms of corporate l<m­
support vesting such unbalanced power in the hancls of the board"); Ronald]. Gilson, 
The Case Against Sharh RejJellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the �,/1(/bling; Cou­
ajJt, 3 4  STA:\. L. REv. 775, 822-27 (1982) (arguing that, due to shareholder ignorance, 
shark repellent amendments should be held invalid even if they are approved lw 
shareholders). 
7 vVe are not the first to make this general point with regard to takeovers. See gen­
erally Barn' D.  Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Antitakemwr Amendments, ,',Jan(/gnio! l:'n­
trenrlnnent, and the Contractual Theo1y of the CmjHrration, 71 VA. L. REV. 1257 ( 1980) (en­
dorsing shareholder-approYed antitakeover charter amendments, but opposing anti­
takeover statutes); Roberta Romano, The Politicall:'ronomy of Takeovn Statutes, 73 V.\. L. 
RE\. l l l  (1987) (same). 
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that presumption on a wholesale basis . Companies should thus be 
free to set up th eir own regirne. Moreover, companies may adopt 
some intermediate regime between shareholder choice and board 
veto-an opportunity that Delaware law affords and many companies 
exerose . 
The ren•ainder of this Article is organized as follows: in Part I, we 
identify two aspects of the decision to sell the company-determining 
its value,  and devising and implementing a selling strategy. As we ex­
plain, the selling strategy is an integral element of a sales mechanism. 
In Part II, we analyze different paradigms for the allocation of de­
cision-making pO\ver '"'hen a public firm receives an acquisition offer. 
The classic debate has been dominated by Hamiltonian proponent<; of 
the board veto school andJacksonian proponen ts of shareholder choice . 
\Ye desuibe the tradeofts betv:een these two regimes and put forward 
and defend a third, �Iaclisonian, option of corporate constitutionalism .  
Specifically, we  argue that shareholders may rationally entrench board 
power because shareholders on their own cannot pursue an effective 
selling strategy.s 
Part III examines how constitutional choices are implemented.  In 
Del<nvare. companies have great flexibility in their constitutional 
choices: through proper charter or bylaw provisions they can entrench 
board structure and shareholder rights inter se and choose different 
degrees of entrenchment. For example, board power can be en­
trenched, in declining degrees, through differential voting rights, 
staggered boards , or barriers to shareholder removal of directors be­
tween annual meetings. 
Part TV reviews the empirical evidence regarding these entrench­
ment modes to determine whether it points to the general superiority 
of a particular decision-making paradigm. We discuss the e'.idence 
reoardino· <:llltitakeover [Jrovisions in initial public offerino-s ( IPOs).  b tJ b ' 
the effect of staggered boards on hostile bids, the effect of poison 
pills on takeover premia, legislatively imposed staggered boards, 
and shareholder votes on staggered boards. v\'e conclude that the 
-- -- ·- ----- ---·-···-- ·-
We are not the onlv authors to note and discuss the role of pree<>mmitmeiW;. 
,'-it·l'. t);·., .Jennifer .'\ rlen & Eric T�1lley, Unrpgulablr Drfrmes and till' PNils of Sha rei! older 
Cl:oiu•. 10:2 L·. P.\. L. Rrv. :177.:181 (:200:1) (arguing that the allocation of control rights 
11·i li affect manger decisions ex ante): l snn A. Stout, The ShaiPholrln as Ulysses: FmjJiriral 
h•idr·1111' l\in illllf'S!on iu Public CmJmmtions "f'olnrtie Board Cmwnwnu', 1:12 U. P.\. L. REV. 
ti()/, ()80-81 (:2003) (discussing the diHiculties in ex ante formal contracting); .')tejJht'n 
,\J. FJain!Jiidge, Dt::.\D H:\'\D .\'\D No H.\'\D PILLS: PRECO:Vl'd!T:V!E'\T STRATEGIES I'\ 
( :oRPOR.\!T l..\11. (LCL-\ Scl1. of L111. Lnv & Econ. Research Paper No. 0�-02, 2002). 
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empirical evidence does not support an imposition of shareholder 
choice or board veto as a mandatory governance structure. 
Part V addresses two issues that arise once shareholders choose to 
entrench a governance structure. First, we examine the problem of 
incomplete implementation: when the board left a loophole in the 
governance structure and a bidder tries to take advantage of it, hovv 
should the courts view last-minute attempts to close the loophole? 
Second, we address the claim that changed circumstances-in particu­
lar, the judicial sanctioning of the poison pill-justif)' a legal bailout of 
shareholders from their choice to entrench the board through a stag­
gered board. \Vhile we conclude that a wholesale judicial bailout is 
not warranted, we argue that there may be a plausible case for a nar­
rowly targeted legislative bailout structured to minimize transaction 
costs and the loss of commitment value. 
I. SELLING THE FIRM 
Buying and selling firms is a complicated undertaking, out of 
which investment bankers and other professionals make a good living. 
It is as much an art as a science, with experience providing much of 
the instruction. In this Part, we identify 1:\v·o aspects of the decision to 
sell a company: determining the value of the company as an inde­
pendent entity; and devising and implementing a selling strategy. "VY7e 
place particular emphasis on the latter aspect, which we believe has 
not been properly emphasized in the takeover literature. 
In deciding whether to sell an asset, an owner must first consider 
the value of the asset if it is not sold and how much effort to expend 
in determining that value. The value of the asset if not sold forms a 
Door to the price the owner would be willing to accept for the asset 
under any circumstance-the resen·ation price. 
Second, the owner must consider its selling strategy. By selling 
strategy, we mean any action designed to increase the price for the as­
set beyond the reservation price. A selling strategy can, among other 
things, entail choosing the time to sell, soliciting offers from other 
bidders or threatening to do so, haggling over price, disclosing infor­
mation to bidders, rejecting an offer, making "take-it-or-leave-it" coun­
ter-offers, or misrepresenting one's vvillingness to sell. 
From the owner's perspective, devising and implementing a good 
selling strategy is very important. ·while knowing the reservation price 
protects the owner against suffering losses from selling the asset, it is 
the selling strategy that determines how much the owner will profit 
from a sale. A well-designed selling stratet,ry will usually en tail the 
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owner rejecting some offers that exceed her reservation price in order 
to induce better offers-even though this entails a risk of not selling 
the asset.!1 
As further discussed below, a shareholder choice regime can have 
the practical effect of inducing a company to auction itself to the 
highest bidder after it receives an offer above the reservation price. It 
is thus important to note that such an auctioning regime is not likely 
to be the optimal strategy for selling the company. For one, an auc­
tion may not be the optimal sales mechanism for a firm. V\l1ether �n 
asset is best sold in an auction or by some other mechanism-such as 
a one-on-one negotiation or sequential search-depends on factors 
such as the number of potential buyers and the distribution of their 
valuations for the asset, 10 the cost to the seller of locating potential 
buyers,11 the cost to buyers of investigating the asset,1� and the seller's 
information about such valuations.1:: The "winner's curse" further 
complicates the choice: the more bidders there are, the more conser­
vative sophisticated bidders are likely to be in bidding.1 1 
A nonauction mechanism is likely to be particularly appropriate 
for the sale of a firm. First, potential acquirers face substantial costs in 
See, e.g., Robert Wilson, RPjmtatiuns in (;({mes and i'drnhets, in G,\:\!E-T!IEORETIC 
MODELS OF BARCAI:\'l:\C 27 , 31 (Alvi n E. Roth eel., 19fl5) (nming that the optim al 
strategy in a simple sequential bargaining model ma1· i1wolve re jection of a fan>rable 
offer); Carl Ehrman & Michael Peters, SNjlll'ntial SPlli ng i\lnlwnisllls, 4 J. Eco�. THEORY 
237 , 238-39 ( 1994) (presenting a model in which optimal selling strateg}· is a moditiecl 
fixed price scheme); R. Preston McAfee & John :\lc; \I ill an , .Smnh Mrc!wni.IJJII, ,[c[ J. 
ECON. THEORY 99, 107-18 (1998) (cleriYing buyer's optimal sequential search str<tteg' 
with a price below buyer's reservation price); John Rile\' & Richard Zeckhauser. OjJti­
mal Selling Strategies: vVhen to Haggle, W7wn to Hold Finn, 98 Q.J. ECo\'. ::!67, �70 (191:)3 ) 
(deriving an optimal strategy which involves take-it-or-lea,·e-it offers above seller's res­
ervation price). 111 
See Peter Cram ton & Alan Schwartz, Us-ing A urtion Theoty to !nfimn Tola'UI'r>r Rr�gu­
lation, 7 J .L. Eco:--: . & ORG. 27, S0-51 (1991 ) (arguing that auctions are inappropriate 
when bidders have common value). 
11 
See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 9, at 100-01 ( 1 988) (showing th�lt a sequen­
tial search mechanism is optimal when a monopsonist facing costs is dealing ,,·ith sell­
ers); see also Charles .J . Thomas & Bart J v\'ilson, A Comj1rnison o{.J..urtions and Multilat­
eral Negotiations, 33 RAND J. Ec:o:--:. 1 4-0, 14-5-:)2 (::!002) (comparing prices between 
auctions and multilateral negotiations depending on number of counter-parties). 12 
See Kenneth R. French & Robert E. McCormick, .\mini Bids, Sunk Costs, and the 
Process of Competition, 57 J. Bcs. 417,431-33 (1984) (arguing that negotiations mav be 
superior to auctions when bidders face estimation costs ) . 
u See .M ichael A Arnold & Steven A. Lippm an , Selecting a Sr,lling institution: Auc­
tions Versus SNfW'ntial Search, 33 ECO\' . l\'Ql'!RY 1, �l (1 995) (showing that sequenti a l 
search is superior to auctions when the number of units solei is small). 
1� Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Prices and the ll'ituwr\ Cuts!'. g:1 R-\:\0 J. EC:O\'. 
1, 2 (2002).  
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deciding whether to make an acquisition offer for a company.1
'
' Such 
costs make potential bidders reluctant to enter an auction and, to the 
extent that bidders do enter, reduce the equilibrium price for which 
the company can be sold.11; Second, bidding firms that fail to acquire 
a target experience substantial declines in their stock price.17 The 
prospect of such declines may further increase bidders' reluctance to 
enter an auction. Third, in an auction, the target company typically 
provides confidential information to all bidders.1H Thus, at least two 
bidders, who are often competitors, have intimate information about 
substantial assets that one of them is about to acquire. This fact may 
well reduce the value of the target to both bidders and, accordingly, 
the price each would be willing to pay.1
'' Indeed, closely held compa­
nies are generally sold in negotiated transactions, rather than by auc­
tion. And even though corporate law rules tend to encourage auc­
tions when a public company is sold, such auctions ensue infrequently 
and when they do occur, almost never draw more than two bidders. 
Even when an auction is optimal,�0 the optimal auction format 
generally involves an owner setting a minimum bid that exceeds the 
owners' reservation price.�1 This bid requirement, ex ante, serves to 
-- ---····---- -----
I.-. SeP :Vlarcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, I"or:kujJs and the JV!arket for Corporate Con­
trol, -l-8 ST,\:\. l .. REV. Ei39, Ei47 (1996) (analyzing the effect of prospective bidders' 
costs on their likelihood of making a bid). 
1'' See French & McCormick, supra note 12, at 428-29 (describing the effect of entry 
fees on the \"<tlue of the winning bid); sef alm Barry E. Adler, A 17uo-ry of Co-rporate Jnsol­
<'1'11!)'· 7'!. :\'YU. L. REV. 343, 355 (1997) (stating that sellers indirectly absorb bidders' 
preparation expenses through lower sale price). 
" .'-iee Paul Asquith, i'viPJga Bids, Uncntainty, and Stockholder RPlums, 1 1  J FIN. ECON. 
£) 1, 75-76 ( 19�3) ( " [U] nsuccessful bidding firms ha\ e significantly negative excess re­
turns immediately after the outcome elate and throughout the first year."). 
1' Sr'!', r•.p;., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279-80 (1989) 
(subjecting differential treatment of bidders to strict judicial scrutiny). 
1'' Bidders will generally sign confidentiality agreements prohibiting them from 
using confidential information for any purpose unrelated to the bid. While such 
agreements ma\' \\·ell be effectiYe in assuring that a bidder does not disclose the infor­
mation to a third part\·, they are unlikely to be effective in assuring that the bidder 
does not use it internallY. 
c" 5iee, P.f!: . . Jerem\ Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Auctions Vnsus Negotiations, 86 AM. 
ECO'-". REV. l RO, 1 87-8�) ( 1996) ( cleri\·ing certain conditions in which auctions are su­
perior to negotiations) ; Arthur De Vany, Institutions for Stochastir: lvfarkets, 143 J 1�­
STITL"!'IO:\.\L & THEORETIC-\L EC:O:\. 91,94-100 (1987) (comparing auctions to posted 
price, sequential search selling); Ruqu Wang, Aurtions Versus Posted-Price Selling, 83 AYI. 
ECO'-". REV. 8c)8. 844-47 (1993) (showing that superiority of auction to posted-price 
selling depends on costliriess of auction and steepness of marginal revenue curve). 
�1 See R. Preston l\lcAfee & .John McMillan. Auctions and Bidding, 25 J ECO:\. 
LITER:\TL"RF 6S)9, 713 (1987) (showing that, for a broad family of action rules and re­
g<trclless of the number of bidders, a seller maximizes its revenue by announcing that it 
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increase the mvner's surplus when only one bidder is willing to pay 
that price (though it can result, ex post, in the owner refusing to sell 
at the highest bid, even if that bid exceeds her own valuation). 
Moreover, an owner would want to control the timing of an auction, 
rather than permit an interested buyer to force the owner to conduct 
an auction. Indeed, given that a buyer wishes to acquire the asset at 
the lowest price possible, it is likely to choose the worst possible time 
for an auction from the perspective of the owner. Thus, even in an 
auction setting, an owner would want discretion in devising the rules 
of the auction. 
II. �WHO DECIDES? HAMILTONIANS, jACKSONIANS, AND MADISONIANS 
The classic debate on how a publicly traded company should de­
cide whether to accept an acquisition offer has been dominated by 
two school� of thought. According to one group of scholars, it is the 
elected representatives of shareholders entrusted with the manage­
ment of the company-the board of directors-whose approval 
should always be necessary to sell a company.�� Boards, in other 
words, should be able to veto an acquisition offer in order to protect 
shareholders from their own bad decisions. Since this school maxi­
mizes the authority of the shareholders' representatives, while accord­
ing only a narrow role to the shareholders themselves in corporate 
decision .!llaking, we follow U.S. constitutional theory and refer to it as 
Hamil toni an. �:1 
According to a second group of scholars, it is the shareholders as 
owners of the company who should, at any time, be able to sell the 
will not accept bids with a reserve price that is always strictly greater than the seller's 
personal value of the ohject);john G. Riley & \Villiam F. Samuelson, Optimal Aurtions, 
71 A\1. ECO\:. REV. 381, 382 ( 1 98 1) (finding the same result). 
�� See Lipton, Takeovp-r Bids, sujHa note 5, at 1 20 ("[W]e accept the premises that 
the directors of a target do not have an absolute duty to accept a takem·er hid and that 
there is no absolute requirement that the question he referred for direct action 
by the shareholders.''); sre also Richard E. IZihlstrom & <:vlichae1 L. Wachter, Cmj)Om/r 
Policy anrl thr Cohrwna of J)p[muare Takeo-:.wr htw, 1 52 U. PA. L. REV. 723, n6 (2003) 
("[Yl]anagement discretion is arguably the appropriate standard for takeover defenses 
. .. . ' ' ) . 
�" SeP Doron Ben-Atar & Barbara B. Oberg, !ntrodurtion: The Pamdoximl {tgru} ol 
the Fedemlisls, in FEDERALISTS RECO\:SIDERED 1, 7-9 (Do ron Ben-Atar & Barbara B. 
Oberg eels., 1998) (discussing the Federalists' elitism and aversion to participatory poli­
tics); seP rtlsoJames P. Marrin, H'lznz RejJIPssion Is Dnnormlic nnd Conslilu!iourtl: Tlzl' Ferle1c 
a/is/ Ther11y of RtjJit'St'nlalion and the Si'dition Art o/ 7798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 1 7 ,  1 :H-43 
( 1 999) (arguing that the Federalists' theory of representation was undemocratic). 
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company, whether or not the board approves of th e sale. 
:- ' Share­
holders, in other words, should have uninhibited choice i n  deciding 
on an acquisition offer. Since this school sees the board as a de\"i ce 
designed to implement the present will of shareholders , we will refer 
to it as Jacksonian."
-
, 
In the first Part, we '",;ill lay out the arguments put forward by the 
Hamiltonians and the Jacksonians. \Ve will then arti culate a third ap­
proach that has been less prominent in the classic debate. According 
to the third school, there are benefits and costs to both board veto 
and shareholder choice. Shareholders may thus decide to delegate 
limited or full veto power to the board. Since in this approach share­
holders may, at least to some degree, rationally entrench board power, 
·we will refer to it as Madisonian."" vVe conclude this Part wi th a brief 
discussion of the divergence between those rul es that are privately op­
timal for shareholders and those that are socially optimal. 
A. Board Veto: The Hamiltonians 
The classic Hamiltonian argument for board veto rests on the 
board's  superior ability to assess the value of the company. Boards will 
typically possess nonpublic information about company \·alue. For 
example, Richard Kihlstrom and Michael V\'achter argue in this Sym­
posium that boards possess superior information about pr�ject risk 
and, thus, about the proper rate at \Vhich expected c ash fl ows are to 
be cliscounted.n Moreover, shareholders , because they are excessivelv 
oriented towards the short-term or just misperceive reality, fail  to ap­
preciate fully the board's  informational advantage."� 
'l-1 5ir'e Fra n k  H. Easterb ro o k  & D<miel R. Fisch e l .  - r;,, Pmjm !?.ole of tr Frn;wt \ 1\ lrt n-
agmu'n l in Resjmnrling to o Ten rler O[fn, �J-J. H .\R\ " . L. Rl::\'. 1 1 () 1 ,  1 1 ()4 ( J Ll0 l ) ( <l rguin?; for 
board passivi tv) . B u t  see Lucian A. Bebchuk,  Comment ,  Thr' Co.\Pj(n Fru ililrt !ing Coilljll'i­
ing Tnula Offen. <J5 H.\RV. L. REV. 1 028, 1 050-56 ( 1 <J8� ) ( cr i t ic iz ing Ltstcrbrook a n d  
Fisc h e l ' s  a rticle and <l rgui ng fo r l i m i ted board discre t io n to sol ic i t U 'lll )X: t i n g  bids ) ;  
Ronald .J. Gilson,  A Strurtu m l  AjJjJJnarh to C01j;umlion1: Iht' Cost . \p:o insl !Jrjr'nl iut Tort in 
in Tm dn Offi'ts, 33 ST.\:\ . L. RE\'. 0 1 9 , l'->2 1 ( 1 98 1 )  (sam e ) .  
T· SPe :\hR\1:\ !\--!EYERS, T H E J\Ch.'-i0:\ 1.\:\ PLRSL\SIO:\ Hi-:'12 ( 1 957 )  ( d escrib ing· the 
. Jackson i a n  theory of popuh r represe n tati on ) ;  H.\RRY ! . . 'v\" \ISO:\ ,  LI  BFRIY .\:\ l l  PO\\'ER: 
THE POl.ITICS OFj.-\CKSO:\lA:\ ,-\\!ERIC\ 42-46 ( I  <J<JO) (same ) .  
"" See j.-\C:K N .  R'\KOVE, ORICI:\.-\l . \H:.\:\1:\GS: POl. ITICS .\.'\D I D F. \S I :\  T i l E  :VL\Kl :\ t ;  
O F  T H E  Co�srnrriO:\ 203-43 ( 1 996) ( describi n g  Madison's  pol i t i ca l  t h emY) ; Cass R. 
Sunstei n ,  fnlrtFSI Gmups in A mmra n  Pulilir Lmt', 38 ST.\:\. L. R!:Y 29, h0-S7 ( 1 90:1) (de­
fi n ing the Madison ian conception uf pol itics a n d  represe n ca tion ) .  
� �  Kih ls trom & Wach ter. sujmt n o te 22,  <lt 542-40 .  
'·' As discussed belm1·, another a rgumen t fo r gran t i n g- t h e  hu�u·d s o m e  decis iol l ­
making p( )wer i s  related to the board ' s  superior abilitY to impkrncnt < l  se l l i n g  straLeg\ .  
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Hamiltonians also have little faith in the adequacy or efficacy of 
the board disclosing information to shareholders. Some corporate in­
formation cann ot be disclosed without destroying the value of the in­
formation to the company. Other information is complex, and share­
holders-being dispersed and lacking proper expertise-may not fully 
grasp its significance.�
'' 
Finally, Hamiltonian proponents of board veto are not greatly 
concerned about agency costs : the possibility that boards may oppose 
offers to maintain control and the related emoluments, or other self­
serving reasons. Because boards have a superior assessment of the 
value of the company and cannot directly communicate the basis for 
Sn' discussion infm Part I I .  C. In addit ion to takeover-related reasons for en tren c h i n g  
board power, there may be o t h e r  i m portan t  non-takeo\·er-related reasons.  I n dee d ,  
these other reasons may potentially outweigh t h e  takeO\·er-re lated considerations. 
First,  en trenchmen t m ay be warranted because it. e n ables a party to make a credible 
comm i tment n o t  to hold up t h i rd parties from whom it  seeks certain acti o n s .  Spe E ri c  
A .  Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Enlrl!ndwwn t: A RmjJjHaisal, 1 1 1  Y\LF. L.J. 
I ()65 ,  1 670-7?, (2002)  ( an alvzi n g  e n tren c h m e n t  of legislation by supermajurity \ O te re­
'lui rements ) .  En trenchment can thus make i t  easier and ch eaper fo r a partY to con trol 
i ts relations wi th other en tities. I n  the corporate context, this en trenchmen t may b e  
\·al uable both in trafirm a n d  i ntetiirm .  I n  t h e  i ntrafirm co ntext, e n tre n c h m e n t  o f  
management may be \·al uable i n  i n d uc i n g  man agers t o  i nvest i n  firm-spec i fic  h u m an 
capi tal .  .\n<. e.g . . Da\ icl D. H adclock, Jonathon R. Macey & Freel S.  iv!cChesney, Pmj;Prty 
Rights in Assl!ts anrl RPsistance to Tender O!Jn�. 7?, VA. L. REV. 70 1 ,  7 1 2- 1 7  ( 1 987) ( ex­
plai n i ng the im portance of m anagem e n t ' s  protection of existing ;.q uasi-re n ts" of hu­
man capital ) .  I n  the i n terfirm c o n text, a jo i n t-ven ture partner, because of th e noro ri­
OLts fragi l i tY of joint  ,·e ntures, may en ter i n to a joi n t  ven ture on m ore fasorahle terms i f  
i t  has assurance that i t  will b e  dealing with th e m an agemen t  team i t  con tracted wi th . 
. -\.l te rnatively, i t  may be that a j o i n t-ven ture party will be will ing to enter i n to a j o i n t  
ven ture w i t h  a non-competi to r  but  n o t  with a competi tor. One 1vay to h a n dle t h i s  
problem is to make t h e  j o i n t  ve n ture terminable upt m a change of con trol o r  i f  a pa rt­
ner is  acqu i red by a competi to r  of the other pa rtner. This.  howe\·er, may j eopardize 
investm e n ts specifi c  to the j o i n t  ven tu re . E n t renched board power (e.g . .  in the form 
of a staggered board ) mav provide the req ui s i te assurance more cheaply. A n eed for a 
commitmen t not to hold up third part ies is also th e reason why one would wan t  to en­
trench a rul e not to sol i c i t  a l ternative b ids, as suggested by board passivi ty proponen ts .  
Sn' id. a t  728-30 ( " U n l i ke t h e  Easterbrook-Fischel proposal s implv t o  b a n  resistance,  a 
boncl-e n f( , rci n g  rul e  \\·o uld not bri ng wi th i t  the risk of firms losing the benefi L� of bar­
gai ning . . . .  " ) .  
Second, entre nchnwnt can be valuable because i t  perm i ts agenda control .  O n e  
can remOH' con te n ti u us issues from t h e  agenda i n  o rder to f(Kus on o t h e r  b us i n ess .  
For example,  "board deference·· m ay al low the partic i pan ts i n  the firm to get o n e  issue 
ofT the agenda (e.g. ,  ch ange of con trol ) ,  wh i l e  focusing on other business ( e .g . ,  re­
structuring the fin n .  building a n ew widget, build i n g  a better widget, etc . ) .  
�··  Once a bid is  made, the p rese nce even of an et1ic: ient stock market wil l  n o t  
m u c h  assist shareh olders in  eval uating newly d isclosed i n t(mnation, s i n c e  the m <lrket 
pri ce is  s trongl)· affec ted by the market's  expectations about the bid,  ra th er th an b\ '  the 
tree-standing value o f  the com pany. 
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their assessment to shareholders, and because boards are believed to 
act in the interest of shareholders , Hamiltonians believe that boards 
should have veto power over acquisition offers. 
B. Shareholder Choice: The jacksonians 
The Jacksonian case in favor of shareholder choice rests on the 
presence of agency costs . Managers , i t  is argued, obtain private con­
trol benefits that they would lose if the company were acquired. To 
protect these benefits, managers are inclined to resist bids even ivhen 
i t  is  in the interest of shareholders to accept the bid. Moreover, the 
threat of being ousted in a takeover induces managers to run the 
company more efficiently initially. In order to assure that managers 
do not block takeovers that are beneficial to shareholders, and do not 
use their ability to block takeovers to ins ulate themselves from the dis­
ciplining forces of the takeover market, it is imperative that share­
holders can independently decide ·whether to accept an acquisition 
offer. 111 The board's role should be confined to providing information 
to shareholders and, according to some, to soliciting other offers and 
thereby stimulating an auction. Jacksonians would thus greatly limi t 
the board' s power to choose the selling strategy. In particular, a 
board would not be permitted to resist a bid, except, as some argue, 
by auctioning the company to the highest bidder, without setting a 
minimum premium, at a time chosen by the hostile bidder. 
Jacksonians admit that boards may have superior information 
about company value, and may even concede that boards cannot al­
wavs communicate this information to sh areholders. Such share-
' 
holder ignorance alone, however, does not j ustify giving the board an 
entrenched veto power. A board endowed with superior information, 
Jacksonians argue, could just  advise shareholders that an acquisi tion 
offer is too low and should be rejected. If that advice is credible, 
shareholders ( realizing the board's  superior information) ·will follow 
it . :1 1 The Hamiltonian posi tion that shareholders need to be protected 
from making bad decisions by giving the board an entrenched veto 
requires not j us t  that shareholders are comparatively ignorant about 
'" Sfe, P.g. , Gilson.  supra note 24, at 845-48 ( cl i .'icussing the argument that share­
holders should decide whether to accept or reject  a tender oiler) . 
: : J  S!'l', e.g . .  Lucian Arye Bebch uk, The C:n1P Ap:([insl Board VP!o in CmjJomlr Tahnnw1s, 
CiY L'. C ! l l .  L. Rn·. 97S,  999- 1 00 1  (2002) ( expla ining thctt " target managers often ha,·e 
private in formati on,  both h a rd and soft, that p ubl ic  i nvestors do not possess '' ) . 
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company value (which Jacksonians may concede ) ,  but that they also 
fai l  to realize their own l imitations ( \·vhich jacksonians dispute ) . 
C. CmjJomte Constitutionalism: The J\.Jadison.irzns 
According to the Madisonian school of thought (which we wil l  
elaborate here ) ,  shareholders may rati onally endow th e board with 
some entrenched power in deciding wheth e r  and h ow to sell  the 
company. �� The Madisonian position differs from the H amiltonian 
and Jacksonian ones, and presents a middle ground between them,  in 
two respects . First, unlike the Hamiltonians, Madisonians vievv share­
h olders as capable of making intelligent decisions on acquisition of­
fers . Howeve r, unlike the Jacksonians, M adisonians do n o t  conclude 
that shareholders should never rationally entrench p ower in the 
board . Second, Madisonians do not argue that the same regime is op­
timal for all companies,  and accept that intermediate regimes,  in 
which board power is entrenched to a l imited degree,  m ay be desi r­
able .  
In our assessment, the s trongest argument for according decision­
making powe r to the board is not the board ' s  supe1i or abil i ty to assess 
company value,  but rather the board ' s  superi or abi l i ty to determine 
and implement a value-maximizing selling strategy. u There are 
-------------- --- - - - --
'� Several other commentators have suggested that grant ing the board power unT 
acq uisi t ion decisions mav i nuease fi rm value wi thout relyi ng on s h a reholders '  i rra­
tional i ty . Scr, P.g. ,  Arlen & Talley, sujmt note 8, at 665 ( concludi ng that  a sh�lreholcler 
choice regime may lead boards to adopt undesirable embedded defenses prior to a 
takeO\ er b id) ;  Baysinger & Bu tler sujmt note 7, at 1 �0:2-03 (arguing that ,  i f  o the r  con­
trol mech an isms function prope l'!)·, ant itakeover provis ions may red uce cosl'i assoc i­
ated wi th a co rporate contro l  market) ; Stout, sujmt note 8, at 709- 1 0  ( p ro posing  that 
commitment to board \'eto power may promote team production ) ;  srr also Romano , 
sujna note 7, at 1 :28-4 1 ( argu in g  th at  certain antitakeover prO\·isions are i n  the i n terest 
of small  shareholders) . 
-�:: PreYious commen tators who I J <t\ e n o ted th at  an ti takem·er deYices mav e n hance 
the targe t 's  bargain ing power i nc l ude :  Behch uk. supm note 3 1 ,  a t  1 00 7-09 (not ing that 
management may ha1·e an ad\'an tage over shareholders i n  bargain i ng si tuations be­
cause shareholders are dispersed ) ; _fohn C. Coates IV, lc'o>:jJl([il l ing Vori([/ion in Tolmn'l'l' 
Dtfenses: Bio i/If' tlu' Lmu_\'1'1:\, 89 C.\L ! . .  REV. 1 :30 1 ,  1 329-3� (200 1 )  ( char�tc teriz ing the 
bargaining power hypo thesis as an ex post _justification ) ;  Robert D<l ines & :\J ich ael 
Klausn er, Do !PO Clwr/1'1:� Mnximi:P hnn \ 'alue 2 A n tilakPOl'N l)mlt'llion in ff'Os, 1 7  JL 
EC:O'\. & ORG. 83 ,  8 9  ( :200 1 )  ( asserting that " [w] here bidders Ltce ac tual or potential 
competi tion in bidding for a target, this collective action problem [ o f  i n ducing share­
holders to accept a bid when h old ing out \l'oulcl be more beneficial] is absen t" ) : Han1· 
DeAngelo & Edward M. Rice, A n tilrtheowr Charier A numdmen/.1 wrrl Stockholder Wealth, l l  
J FI '\ .  Eco'\. �29. 3c35 ( 1 983) (not ing tha t priYate i ncenti\'eS for incl i\ i d ua l sh<�rehold­
ers to tender result in collec tin·h· subop timal tendering decisions because indi\iclual 
� hareholders will '"at tempt to appropriate the premium offer in a tender bid for 
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several reasons for this superiority and \vhy it may lead companies to 
entrench some decision-making power in the board. 
First, picking a sel ling strategy involves subtle and complex deci­
sions.:1 1  Should one solicit a competing bid? Should inducements be 
offered to other bidders? Should one make a counter-proposal and if 
so, at what Jeye]? Determining a proper s trategy and implementing it 
is costly and may require coordinated action. Public shareholders are 
ill-equipped to bear these costs and engage in such coordination .:F• 
Second, a selling s trategy often requires a level of secrecy that 
shareholders are unable to maintain . Even if shareholders could 
communicate at low costs, communications among a large group of 
shareholders are unlikely to remain confidential .  Moreover, federal 
law requires disclosure of certain shareholder communications. :;�> 
Shareholders therefore, would have difficulty coordinating with each 
other without disclosing their strategy to the bidder. 
Third, shareholders wear their resen•ation price on their sleeves. 
Their assessment of the value of their shares-the m arket price at  
which the stock trades-is readily available .  But when the s tock trades 
for ten dollars , shareholders may have difficulty persuading a bidder 
that they would refuse any offer below, say, twelve dollars a share. By 
corporate control " ) ;  Haclcl < lCk, ;'v[acey & \IIcChesney, sujJra note 28,  a t  740 (arguing 
generallY that the board passiYity rule may be undesirable as i t  precludes bargain ing) ; 
Dale A. Oesterle, Thr Xrgotiation /vlodl'l of Tnuln O!Jt>r DrJi'nsPs and thl' Dl'laware Supreme 
Cou rt, 7'2 CoR:\ELL L RE\·. 1 1 7 ,  1 24-:) ] ( l 9So) (asserting that managers serve as more 
effecti\ e barga i n ing agen ts than shareholders because managers' knowledge of the 
compam·\ val ue allow� for better offer assessment, and because they do not face the 
same pressure to tender in order to an>id being left out if the offer succeeds) ; Dale A. 
Oesterle, Ta'f!tt Ma n rtgns as Negotirttinp; A.gmts for Twgr'l Shareholders in Tender Offers: A 
Reply to !he Passh,ily Thl'sis, 7 1  COR.': E LL L. REV. 53,  56-63 ( 1  985 ) (arguing that share­
holders need a ba rgain i n g agent to a' oicl acceptance of a coercive offer) ; Rene M .  
Stulz, ;\{rt n agnial Cnutml of Voting Rights: Fin ancing PoliciPs and thr i'vlarhPt for CmjHnate 
Con t rol, 20 J. FI:\.  Ec :o:--: .  2:), :Z �-34 ( 1 98�) (modeling the desirabil ity of managerial con­
trol of Wl tin g rights to ex tract a h igher premium in a context where dispersed share­
holders arc bcecl \\·ith a coerci ,·e offer) . The5e commentators, howeYer, have not 
drawn the sam e impl icati o n s  from th is obserYation as we do. 
:< I Sr'l' gnt Pm/ly l-! 0\1 .. \IU) R:\lFF.-\, THE ART 8..: SC:IE"'CE OF NEGOTL-\TIO� 9 1 - 1 07 
( 1 9�2) (detai l ing expe ri m e n t a l  findings regarding negotiative practices as they relate 
to acquisitions and mergers ) .  
:F. The board could, o f  course ,  bear these cosL�, pro;-ide information ,  and advise 
shareholders about the proper sell ing strategY, Iewing the ult imate decision to the 
shareholde rs. But in practice this option would enta i l  the publ ic disclosure of that in­
formation and ach ice,  wh i ch ,  as cl i sc ussecl belm\·, would undermine the sell ing strategy. 
,, ;  
StY. P.g . .  Solici tation of P roxi es , 1 7  C . F . R .  � 240 . 1 4a (2003) (detai l ing infonna­
tion that mus t  be communicated to shdreholders and to the Securities Exchange Com­
!11 Jssion in a sol i c i tation of proxv, i n cluding sol ic i tat ions i n  oppos i tion to mergers or 
o ther  extraorcl i n<uY tr;msac t ions ) . 
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contrast, a bidder has less information about the board's assessment 
of the company's value. :17 
Fourth, the board has a greater ability than dispersed sharehold­
ers to make threats and commitments that are credible. This greater 
ability results from the fact that the board can make investments to 
enhance its credibility, has a stable composition, can engage in coor­
dinated action, can maintain secrecy about i ts strategy, and has the 
ability not to disclose its reservation price. Among other things, the 
board may make reputational commitments not to accept low pre­
mium offers, :�x or may develop over-optimism (which make credible 
statements that the board believes that low premium offers, in fact, fall 
short of the company's true stand-alone value) ,
:1!1 or may even act irra­
tionally.411 Moreover, as discussed below, the very presence of private 
control benefits can serve to make a commitment not to sell at a low 
premium credible.  A dispersed and fluid group of shareholders , by 
contrast, lacks an effective ability to make these threats and commit­
ments. 
Importantly, Jacksonian arguments for why a board' s  superior 
ability to assess company value does not justifY board veto do not ap­
ply, at least not with the same force, to the board's  superior ability to 
develop and implement a selling strategy. First, Jacksonians argue 
that managers' personal interest in maintaining control makes it un­
desirable to entrench board power. 11 But some conflicts of interest 
:<• s·ee R:\IFF.\ , sujJ-rrt n o te 34, at 46-47 (noting desirabil ity of m isleading the other 
side about one's  reservation pri ce ) ; see also CHARLES B. CRA.VER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL 
N EGOTL\TIO:\ A:\D SETTLF.ME:\T 1 7 1 -72 (2nd eel. 1 993) ( noting that parties with a 
h igher aspiration lnel achieve better results i n  bargaining) . 
" 
See, e g. ,  THO :VIAS C. SCHELL!�G, THE STRUEGY OF CO:'\FLJCf 29-3 1 ,  35-43 ( 1 980) 
(discuss ing the bargain ing technique of pledging one's  reputation on a public offer to 
create commitment-a limitation on the bargaining latitude of the agen t) ; DaYicl M. 
Kreps & Robert B.  'Ni lson,  Rejnllation and lmjmfert Information, 27 J .  ECO :'\ .  THEORY 253, 
254 ( 1 982)  (asserting that the reputation of a bargain ing  agent  can d issuade an oppo­
nen t from actions detrimental to the agent 's  firm) .  :I!J 
See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2cl 858, 876 (De l .  1 985)  ( noting testimony by 
several executives that "as a general rule, most chief executives think tha t  the market 
underval ues their  companies' stock'' ) ; Ronald J. Gilson ,  Lipton and Rowe 's Apologia for 
Delaware: A Short Rrpl)', 2 7  DEL J .  CORP. L. 37,  42 ( 2002) (suggesting that managers 
may in good fai th belie\·e that the company's outlook is posi tiYe) .  
"" 
CHESTER L KARRASS, THE NEGOTIATING GANlE 7 1 -72 ( 1 970) ( explaining the 
power of irrational ity to achie\'e positive results in negotiation " if  the negotiator can 1 )  
be sure that his opponent understands what h e  can gain by reaching a n  agreemen t, 
and 2 )  can cmwince the opponent that he is emotionally committed to the reasonable­
ness of his ' irrational' position'' ) .  1 1  
See, e. g. ,  Bebch uk, sujtm note 3 1 , at 991-94 (explain ing the ex post and ex ante 
agency costs associated with board veto) . 
2003] CORPOR A T�' CONS'11TUJ70NAL!SM 487 
between shareholders and managers enhance the board 's  ability to use 
a selling strategy effectively. 1� In the particular context of takeovers , 
private control benefits make credible the threat to rej ect low pre­
mium offers. If managers obtain private control benefits, it is in their 
actual interest to block such offers. But companies can (and do) 
adopt devices that reduce the degree and the effectiveness of manage­
rial resistance as the premium rises-for example, by granting manag­
ers stock options (which become more valuable as the premium in­
creases) or by having outside directors placed on the board who are 
not fully beholden to management (who may overrule managers re­
luctant to accept a high-premium offer) .4:1  As a result, conflict<; of in­
terest may induce a board to rej ect low premium bids, but not bids 
where the premium is sufficiently high. This, however,  may be exactly 
the selling strategy shareholders would want to pursue. Thus, the 
presence of some private control benefits, which provide the intellec­
tual underpinning for the shareholder choice regime, are not merely 
compatible with granting the board decision-making power, but may 
strengthen the case for it. 
Second, boards will rarely, if ever, be able to bring shareholders 
up to speed by disclosing information about its selling strategy. By 
disclosing such information to the shareholders ,  the information is 
also disclosed to the bidder. Unlike information that relates to the 
substanti\'e value of the company, such strategic information will, in 
most cases, lose its value if it is publicly disclosed. 
Third, to implement a selling strategy effectively, a board' s  deci­
sion-making powe r must be entrenched, at least to some degree. If a 
board 's  power is not entrenched, any board decision can be overrid­
den at any time by shareholders. But this makes it more difficult for 
42 That a principal can benefit by giving power to an agent  wi th confl icting i nter­
ests is wel l  documented in the game theory l i terature. See gnlfrally Chaim Fershtman, 
Kenneth L. Jude\ & Ehud Kalai .  Obseroable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Coojm ation, 
32 1:'\T'L. ECO:'\. REV. 55 1 ,  551-52 ( 1 99 1 )  (summarizing the l i terature documenting the 
strategic advantage of employing  a bargaining agent with different incentives ) ;  Michael 
L. Katz, Grune-Pla_ying Agmts: Unobseroable Contracts as Prerom mitmPnts. 22 RAND ]. Eco:--: . 
307,  309 ( 1 99 1 )  ( arguing that an unobservable contract between a principal and an 
agent has no effect on a negotiation when the existence of the contract is common 
knowledge ) ;  John Vickers, Delegation and the 17mny of ihl' Finn, 95 Eco:--:. ]. 1 38, 1 39-43 
( 1 985 ) (explaining how delegating power to an agent can benefit the principal ) .  
I:' SPP i'v[arcel Kahan & Edward B .  Rock, How I !.earned lo Stop Wonying a n rl I.ovl' the 
Pill: .-tdajJI ivf' Responses to Takeovn Law, 69 U .  CHI. L. REV. 87 1 ,  909- l l ( 2002) ( describ­
ing how tirms adopt devices, such as incentive compensation and independent direc­
tors, that al ign managers' in terests with shareholders sufficiently to reduce managerial 
opposition to changes of con trol ) .  
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the board to make credi ble th reats or commitments or employ other 
strategic devices. " '  \'\l1enever a bidder is dissatisfied wi th the action of 
the board, the bidder can j ust go over the board ' s  head an d appeal di­
rectly to the shareholders. E n trenching board power is  thus compati­
ble with shareholders real izi ng their own l imitations.  
Finally, it  may well be desirable to entrench the board 's  power be­
fore a bid is  received."'' In this way, the board obtains the first moYer 
advan tage in making commitments .  On the other hand, if the board's  
power is not entrenched ex ante, i t  is  the bidder who h as the first 
mover advantage . This pennits the bidder to take steps to signal that 
it will not offer a high premium. A bidder could, for example,  de­
velop a reputation as a tough bargainer, finance a bid i n  a way that 
makes raising it more diffi cult,  or make public s tatemen ts about i ts in­
tentions that would expose the bidder to potential securi ties fraud l i­
abil i ty if i t  raised i ts bid. 1 '; Alternatively, the bidder could signal an in­
tention to wi thdraw i ts bid if target shareh olders were to entrench a 
board ' s  power ex post ( e .g . ,  by failing to elect the bidder 's  slate in a 
proxy contest) . Thus, if a board ' s  power is not entrenched before a 
bid is received,  i t  may well be too late . 
As this discussion highligh ts ,  th e optimal allocation of decision­
making power depends on several empirical factors that may vary 
from company to company. These factors include the balance be­
tween the significance of the board ' s  informational advantages and 
the importance of selling strategies, on one hand,  with the various 
benefits from constraining agen cy costs on the other. Second order 
fac tors include the abil ity to obtain the benefi ts of the board' s  advan­
tages without board ve to ( e . g. , by having the board disclose i ts infor­
mation directly or by having the board i ns ti tute an auction)  and the 
abil ity to constrain agen cy costs while still entre nching board power 
( e . g. ,  as we have argued elsewhere , through the use of independent 
-- -- -- -- -- - ---- -----
·H 
See genemlly SCI I ELLI:'\G, supm note �8. a t  � :!-:!8 ( disc ussi ng t h e  i m portance of 
comm i tment in bargain ing) . 
4; One problem with the mandatory process rule enabling shareholders to opt tix 
a federal shareholder choice regime, see BC&S , supra text accompanying nute ti, or a 
mandatory rule giving shareholde rs the abi l i ty to amend the corporate ch arter. see 
William \V. Bratton & Joseph A. �>'lcCaherY, Rl'f;lllatorr c:omjJr'litiml, Rl'gulat()/y CrtjJ!wP, 
and Cmporale Selj�Regulatirm, 73 N . C.  L REV. 1 86 1 .  1 �2() ( 1 995 ) ,  is that  these refo rms 
would destroy such commitm e n ts and,  i f  tru ly mancb torY, m<lke i t  impossible to make 
such commitments. 
"'' 
5iee Marcel Kahan , Grunes, Lies, nnrl . '-il'cu rities F! a u rl. 67 � .Y. C .  L REV. 7:10 , 7()8-Ti 
( 1 992) ( describing poten tial l iabi l i ty for negotiation s t a te m e n ts) ; Sl'l' rtlso CIZ.\\TR, sujmt 
note 37, at 246-47 ( proYiding exam ples of h ow the use of public statements helped 
parties improve their  nego tiation posi tions) . 
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direc tors and executi\·e stock option s)  . 1 7 For that reason,  different 
companies may make ditlerent choices,  and many companies may 
pursue an intermediate choice and entrench a board ' s  power to some 
limited extent. 
Curren t  Delaware lav.r permits a range of options from pure Jack­
sonian shareh older choice to uncons trained Hamiltonian board veto. 
A firm can adopt shareholder choice by gi,ing shareholders the right 
to remove at wil l  a board that fails to heed shareholder wishes;  it can 
adopt a pure board veto paradigm by means of dual class s tock or a 
deadhand poison pill placed into the charter; or i t  can adopt any 
number of i n termediate structures , including ann ually elected ( bu t  
nonremovable)  boards and classified boards. As measured b y  the 
number of months before an unsolicited bid is put to a decision by 
the shareholders ,  the options range from about one month (as dic­
tated bv federal securities law) to infinitv. As we discuss in  more detail 
/ / 
below, most companies curren tly have governance struc tures that 
permit the board to delay a bid for either three to six mon ths or fif­
teen to eigh teen months.  At its core , our argument in this Article is 
that a variety of choi ces of governance structures are plausible,  and 
that shareholders '  choice of a particular structure should be re­
spected. 
D. The Ana�vtical Per:5pective 
For most of this Article ,  we examine how different decision­
making paradigms may affect the val ue of the corporation,  as opposed 
to social wealth more broadly defined. vVe adopt this analytical per­
spective for several reasons. First of al l ,  the focus of most of the schol­
arship on takeovers and takeover defenses relates to their effects on 
target shareholders .  Second, Delaware corporate law takes the fi rm 
as the fundamental unit of analysis and cons tructs and enforces fidu­
ciary duties toward the shareholders of a given firm . Thus, to the ex­
ten t  that several commentators ( ourselves included) address their pol­
icy arguments to Del aware courts and l egislators, these argum ents are 
correctly premised on determining the set of legal rules that enhance 
the value of a firm , not that maximize the value of a diversified portfo­
l io or some other measure of social weal th . Th ird ,  a full analys is of 
how the corporate lmv rules of a firm affect cons tituents other than i ts 
shareholders is extraordinarily complex. 
4 7  Kahan 8..: Roc k ,  suj;m note 43, at  t)96-99.  
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vVe nevertheless want to address, if only briefly, the argument that 
corporate law rules should make it difficult  for a company to p ursue 
i ts optimal selling strategy since a superior selling strategy merely re­
sults in a wealth transfer from acquirers to targe ts and, therefore, does 
not in crease social wealth . The reason we need not dwell on this 
point is that it has largely been addressed in the takeover debate in 
the 1 980s. At that time,  proponent<; of the so-called "passivity thesis"40 
argued that all defensive devices designed to raise a bid-incl uding 
the solicitation of compe ting bids-are undesirable because they en­
tail costs ,  and any gains from a higher bid represent only private , not 
social, gains.�!� Opponen ts of manage1ial passivi ty, which i ncluded 
many Jacksonian advocates of shareholder choice, replied that higher 
gains to targets may be socially desirable ex ante because they create 
incentives to invest in future targe t companies and for targets to 
search out acquirers . ''o More generally, they pointed out that dis­
persed shareholders of a public company should have the same ability 
to refuse an offer as a sole owner does. : "  And a sole owner, after all ,  is 
free to bargain to maximize her surplus even though such bargaining 
only results in a wealth transfer ( ex post) . 
I I I .  LV!PLEMEi'\TING A CO i\'STITUTIOI'\AL REGL'dE 
In this Part, we discuss how a desired governance regime can be 
implemented under Delaware law. I n  implementing such a regime, 
one m ust address two related problems: h mv to make a commitment 
stick, and whether and h ow to perm i t  modifications of the commit­
ment as time goes by. This is a problem of balancing the commitment 
function of the governance structure with the need to respond f1exibly 
to un anticipated developments .  That is, it is fi rst and foremost an 
---·-·-- -----
IH 
See, e.g. , Easterbrook & Fischel ,  sujmt note 24,  at  1 1 94-1 204 ( proposing a theory 
such that "shareholders would wan t management to be passive in the face of a tender 
offer") . 
•. , See id. at 1 1 75-80 ( arguing that "resistance that ul timately el ic i ts a higher bid is 
socially wasteful" ) . 
'•' I . SeP, P.g. , Lucian A. Bebchuk,  The Cose for Farilitating ComjJeting Ten der Offe/5: A 
RejJ(\' and E'(tension, 35 STA:". L.  REv. 23, 38-39. 42-45 ( 1 982) ( suggest ing that "imped­
ing competing bids would curtail the i ncen tives to prospective sellers '  search" and that 
"faci l i tating competin g  bids . . .  moves us closer to the optimal investment leYels in any 
gi\'en company" ) ; Haddock et a! . ,  sujna n o te 28, a t  706- 1 2  (describing '' [w] ealth crea­
tion through takeovers") . 
,·o � Sn• Lucian A. Bebch uk, The Soft Ownr>r Stan d  au/ for Takeovn Pu/i()', 1 7  J. LEGAL 
STl' D .  1 97 .  1 98 ( 1 988) (arguing that " the  dispersed shareholders of a target should be 
able to fol low the same course of action that a sole owner would") . 
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exercise in consti tutional design . Problems of this nature commonly 
emerge when the desirability of commitmen t and the desirabil ity of 
flexibili ty clash , whe ther,  as here, in the context of public corpora­
tions or in the context of state constituti ons, i n ternational treaties,  
close corporati ons, j oi n t  ventures, or maniage . 
A. CorjJorate Constitutionalism 
Corporate constitutionalism raises fewer theoretical difficulties 
than pol i tical consti tutionalism. In the corporate context, as opposed 
to the political context, the j ustification of the legi timacy of the consti­
tutional document can more convincingly rest on a straigh tforward 
con tractarian argument because consen t  is actual not constructive.  
Investors need not buy shares of a company in an IPO or secondary 
market if they do not l ike the charter. '·� Likewise, claims of construc­
tive consen t to midstream deYelopments b ased on the possibi l i ty of 
exit are more convincing in the corporate context than in the political 
context because dissatisfied shareholders have a more realistic exit op­
tion than dissatisfied citizens do:  individually, they can sell their 
shares , and collectively, such selling can exert pressure for change by 
depressing the share price .  As a res u l t, the possibil ity of exit imposes 
more significant constraints on managers and controlling sharehold­
ers than on governments .  
But corporate constitutions share a key feature with both older 
and newer pol i tical consti tu tions:  th ey are instruments for making 
commitments that are designed to outlive the framers and their gen­
eration. · ·  Stephen Holmes makes the point nicely: 
·· ---- --- -·--· - -- - -- · -· -- --- -- -- --
:." I n  this regard, the co rporate consti tution is much m o re s imi lar  to the older 
constituti ons l ike Magna Carta, 11·h i c h  were l tnclerstoocl as contracts between th e sover­
eign and cliffe ren t estates. 
·, 1 There is  ri ch l i te ra ture on constitutional frameworks as prcco m m i tm e n t  de­
vices. Sn', e.g. , Jon Elster, Con.\Prfll!'nrPs of Constitutional ChoiCP: &fleet ions on Tot:queville, 
in CO\'STITCTIO:'\AL!Sivl A:'\0 DE\IOC :R.AC\ 8 1 ,  9�-97 Qon Elster & Rune Slagstad eels . ,  
1 988) (analyzing p recommitment strategies given Tocquevi l le's view that democracy is 
not a stable form of g01·ernment that can plan for future eve n L'i or p roceed system ati­
cal h·) ; STEPHEI\ HOL:o- !ES, PASS!O:\S .\:'\D C :O:\STR:\1'\T: 0:'\ THE THEORY OF LIBERAL 
D F.MOCR:\C:Y 1 38-62 ( U n i\·. of Chicago Preo;s 199:1) ( describing vario us p o l i tical  theo­
rists' \·iews on precommi tmen t and democracy) ; Samuel Freeman,  Constitutional Delnor­
rary and the Legitimacy o{.fudirial RP·uirw, 9 L\ \\' & PHIL 327, 353 ( 1 990)  ( n o ting that 
'judicial re\·iew is  a kind of rati o n al and s h a red precommitm e n t  among free and equal 
sO\·e reign ci tizens at the l evel or const i tutional c h o ice'') . For a book-length exploration 
of the incen tive effects of constitu tional commi tme n ts,  see generally ROBERT D .  
COOTF.R, T!!F STRATEGIC: CO:'\STllTTIO:\ (:!OUO) . 
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A l i beral constitutional fram ework is a c lassic solution to a col lecti,·e ac­
tion p roblem. People m ay ,·o l u n tarily rel inquish their  ab i l i ty to choose 
( in some matters) i n  order to accompl ish their wi l l  ( in other m a tters ) . 
Collective sel f-binding can the refore be an i nstru m e n t  of collec tiYe se lf­
ru le .  Rul es restri cti ng a\ ailablc options can enable indivi duals and 
communi ties to ach i eve more of their  specific aims than they c o u l d  if  
they were al l  left e ntirely unco!1Strained.  Such is  the democ ratic  fi.mc­
tion of co nstitutional restrai n ts.
'" 
B .  Constitution al Design i n  Delaware 
In understanding the Delaware corporate constitutional frame­
work, one needs to look both to the sorts of corporate constitutional 
provisions permitted in Delaware and to the manner in which courts 
interpret consti tutional terms when disputes arise.  As 've wil l  show, 
Delaware provides a substantial degree of flexibility to parti cipants in 
the design of a consti tu tional govern ance s tructure and gen e rally en­
forces those governance arrangements li terally. 
1 .  Topics of En trenchment: 
\IV'hat Matters M ay Be E n trenched? 
Before turning to the "how" of entren chment, i t  is worthwhile to 
focus on what terms can be entrenched. Here , Delaware provides 
great lati tude. It permits the inclusion of: 
[ a] ny p rovision for the managemen t of th e business and for the conduct 
of the affairs of the corp o rati o n ,  and any p rovis i o n c reating, d e fin i n g, 
-,4 HOL\!ES, s 1 1jJra note 53, at 1 73 .  The re is anoth e r. more subtle way i n  wh ich c o r­
porate consti tutionalism is less problematic than pol i ti cal  constituti onal is m .  I n  the 
polit ical context,  precummitt ing to de legate certain decisions to a part ic ular decision­
maker or gcn·ernance structure, as o pposed t.o precom m i tt ing to a particular crwsal 
mechanism, may cont1ict  wi th a prope r underst<mding of democratic decision making. 
For an acute a rticulation of this \·iew, see . Je remy \Yaldron,  Prrrommitnwn f and Disogret'­
menl, in COi'\STlfl:Tio:'\.-\l.!S\1: P I ! ILOSOPII IC :  Fm.·:--:uxno:--:s 2 7 1 , 278 ( LatTY Alexander 
eel . ,  1 998) : 
That is,  the art of precorn m i tm e n t  may be autonom ous, but i ts ope rati o n  may 
be someth i ng less than a consummation of the age n t " s  auton omy inasmuch as 
it is subject to the j udgm e n t  of  a n o t h e r. In other words, i t  wou l d  n o t  be a 
form of p recommitment that enabled one to rebut an objection based on the 
i m p o rtance o f  A's hanging o n  to his autonomy or. in the case of consti tutional 
constraints, an ol�j ection on democratic grounds . 
By con trast, i n  the corp o ra te con text, t h e  parall e l  to democratic decision making. 
namely, share h older action , is l argely instrumen tally \·iewed as a means of m a x imizing 
fi rm value. If  delegation m aximizes firm value (e .g . ,  i n  t h e  creation o f  a board of di­
re c to rs or the delegation to the board uf the sale decision ) ,  it is no argument aga i ns t  
th<tt  delegation tha t  i t  i n fringes on shareholder so\"ereign ty. 
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l im iting and regu laLi n g  the powers of the corporation, the directors, and 
the sLockholcl e rs.  o r  atw class of the stoc kho l de rs . . .  if such proYisions 
<tre not co n tra rY to th e l ;n,·s o f  r.h is State .�"-, 
This general authorization , combin ed with more specific  statutory 
provisions, permits tailoring across the relevant dimensions of govern­
ance: board structure and shareholder voting rights i n ter  se.  
a .  Board structure 
The defaul t  setting for Delaware corporations provides for man­
agement by a board of directors whose members are elected annually 
for one-year terms.  However, Delaware l aw permits companies to vary 
these default rules i n  a n umber of ways. First, the board can be "clas­
sified" i n to up to three classes,  thereby creating the standard "stag­
gered" board with one-half or one-third of the directors elected each 
'-· 
year. ·,,; Secon d, holders of any class of stock may be given the righ t  to 
elect directors with terms and voting powers that may differ from 
those of other directors. -'7 Third,  one can place director qualification 
requiremen ts ,  board quorum req uirement<; ,  and board voting rules 
i n to the charter, -.� or even completely opt out of the board-centered 
model of governance . -, . ,  
--- --- ---·- --
: • . •  DEI .. C�f> D F. ,.:_\:\ \:. ti t .  H .  8 l 02 (b )  ( I )  (200 1 ) .  :·J I J  fd. � 1 4 l ( cl) . -.7 !d. This st;t tu ton· prm·ision. added i n  1 9 74, was meant to clarify certain charter 
prm·isions defin ing th e Hlting righ ts of preferred stockhol ders. I n si tuform of N. Am. ,  
I n c .  1·. Chand l e r , !) ;) 4  A.�cl '2:'=,7 ,  2 6 8  ( D el .  Ch. 1 987) .  P referred s tockholders com­
m o n ly h ave con tinge n t  rights to appoint d i rectors t h a t  ma ture only i f  the firm bils to 
pay certain cli,·iclencls to the preferred stockholders . In a firm with a th ree-class classi­
fied board , if Lhose conditions come to pass, are the preferred stockh olders ' ri gh ts 
,·alieF The a rgument against  \·alidi ty was t h a t  D e l aware bw perm itted a maximum of 
t h ree classes of d i re c tors. ancl the el ec Lion of direc to rs by the pre ferred stockholders 
would c,mst itu te <1 1 1  il leg<tl fn u 1 th class.  The new language was added to § 1 4 1  (d)  to 
remo1 e any d oubt.  lnsit ujorlll, 5:�4 .\.2d at 26:1 (quo t i ng ARSHT & BLACK, A='iALYSIS OF 
TI IF 1 97..J. A\I E�D\I E�TS TO Tilt: D EL:\WAR.E GE�ER.\L CORPOR.\TIOi\' L•\\V 375,  377 
( P ren tice Hall Corp. Se n·. 1 �174) . I n teres t i n glY, for our purposes, this proYisi on opens 
up the possibilitv for substan tial addit ional tai lorin g  of governance and entrenc hment 
go i n g  well  hevond that c reated ])\' a  s t a ndard three-class board . For examp le , one can 
establish a term of oHice l onge r thdn the three-year maxim um provided bv the stan­
dard classified hoard example h\ tvi n g  the election of directors to a particular class of 
stock. 
-,, § 14 1 ( b ) . 
-,,, .r:)rr' � 1 4 1  ( a) ( "The hus i n e�s a n d  aih i rs of eYery corpo ration organized under 
this c hapter s h a l l  be managed b\· or under the d i rection of a board of eli rec to rs ,  Pxrrpt 
rts lltaY l:e o/hrnuise jmrflirlrd in this rhrtfJ!rr or in its rr'rlijicalr' of inrorjJoralion." ( emphasis 
added l ) .  
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Adoption of particular board structures also has implications for 
the permitted grounds for removal of directors. If the board is not 
staggered, shareholders can remove directors with or without cause.''o 
But when the board is staggered, shareholders may remove directors 
only for cause unless the charter provides otherwise.1'1 
b. Shareholder rights inter se 
Delaware law also allows the tailoring and entrenchment of provi­
sions governing shareholder relations inter se. Thus, one can deviate 
from the one-share, one-vote default setting by issuing supervoting 
shares or shares with no voting rights. One can provide for cumula­
tive voting, which can assure board representation to a minority of 
shareholders, or give special rights to shares of a particular class. ''� 
Again , these provisions implicate shareholders' ability to remove di­
rectors. When a firm has cumulative voting, a director can be re­
moved without cause only if the votes cast against removal would not 
be sufficient to elect such director if cumulatively voted in her favor.":\ 
vVhen directors are elected by a particular class or series of stock, they 
can be removed without cause only by those same stockholders unless 
the charter provides othervvise." '  Finally, one can adopt structures 
that tend to preserve a particular allocation of voting rights, such as, 
adopting charter provisions providing for "preemptive right [s] " to 
subscribe to additional issues of stock_,,
-
, 
c. Providing for changes over time 
Delaware's  flexibility even extends to permitting future changes, 
with charter provisions springing into existence or "sunsetting." Thus, 
one can provide for "initial directors" to senre for an "initial period; """ 
for different classes of stock to convert into a single class at a particu­
lar date;';' for a classified board as of a certain date''x or one that ceases 
till 
§ 1 41 (k) . 
'''
§ 1 4 1 ( k) ( l ) .  I)� ., -
!d. s b l .  
, ;, § 1 4 l ( k) (2) . 
,;� 
§ 1 4 1  (k) ; Sl'e also I nsituform of N. Am . ,  Inc .  v. Chandler, 534 A.2d 257,  266-67 
( Del .  Ch. 1 987) ( referencing the statutory provision in i ts discussion of removal proce­
dures ) .  
t>,-, DEL. CODE A:\:\'. tit. 8 ,  § l 02 (b) (3)  ( 200 1 ) .  
"" 
Comac Partners v. Ghazna\1 , 793 A.2d 372, 374 ( Del .  Ch.  200 1 ) .  
, ;., lrl. 
,;, Irl. 
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after a certain date;w or for the corporation i tself to terminate at some 
particular time and enter into liquidation.70 
2 .  Modes of Entrenchment 
As the political theory literature on constitutions poi nts out, provi­
sions can be entrenched through both formal and infon11al means. In 
D elaware, different degrees of entrenchment can be achieved through 
1:\vo formal mechanisms : the choice of instrument containing the 
term and the voting requirement to change the instrument. To mod­
ify a charter term, Delaware law requires both a recommendation of 
the board of directors and a shareholder vote .71 Bvlaw tenus can be 
J 
modified either by the shareholders or by the board (or, in some 
companies, only by shareholders) . 7� Thus, placing a term i n  the char­
ter results in  greater entrenchment than placing it in the bylaws.7:1 A 
term can be further entrenched by requiring a supermaj ority vote of 
either shareholders or directors to change it. 74 Delaware law also 
permits "contingent" supermajority provisions, such as a supermajority 
to approve a merger with any person who has acquired a defined per­
cent of the shares prior to the merger, but not for other mergers _,
-
, 
Staggered board provisions,  one of the most significant devices 
used to entrench board power, can be placed in the charter or the 
bylaws, but any bylavv establishing a staggered board midstream re­
quires shareholder approval-even if the board is,  in other respects, 
empowered to amend the bylaws unilaterally.71' For staggered boards, 
therefore, the difference in placement mostly affects the degree of 
''!' See, P.g. , Harrah 's Entm ' t, Inc .  v. JCC Holding Co. ,  802 A.2d 294, 296 (Del .  Ch. 
2002)  (noting that a classified board s tructure was in  place for a th ree-year period) . 
711 DEL. CODE A.'\:\'. tit. S , § 102 (b) (5 )  (200 1 ) .  
71 !d. § 242 (b) . 
7� !d. � 1 09 (a) . 
7:< Any provision that may be contained in the bylaws may be included in the char­
ter. !d. � l 02 (b)  ( l ) .  But the reverse is not true,  and many important consti tutional 
arrangements must be contained in the charter. !d. § 1 4 1  (a) . 
7 1 § 1 02 (b )  (4) . 
,-, See. e.g. , Seibert v. Culton Indus . ,  No. 563 1 ,  1 979 WL 2710 ,  a t "! (De l .  Ch. June 
2 1 ,  1 979) , njfd, 4 1 4  A.2d 822 (Del .  1 980) (upholding a provision requiring an eighty 
per cent supermajority to apprO\·e a merger with an "entity owning 5 per cent or more 
of the corporat ion 's out� tanding voting s tock" ) ; see also Berlin v. Emerald Partners ,  552 
A.2d 482, 484-85 (Del .  1 988) (discussing what triggers a supermajori ty vote and the 
quorum requirement associated wi th that vote ) .  
7'' DEL CODE A.1'\Ji\. tit. 8 ,  § l 4 l (d)  ( 200 1 )  ( providing that a board may be classified 
"by the certificate of incorporation or by an initial bylaw, or by a bylaw adopted by a 
vote of the s tockholders") . 
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entren ch ment ( rather than the ease of adop tio n ) .  If the provision is 
placed in the ch arter, it can be removed only with the bila te ral ap­
proval of the board and the shareholders ." If th e provision is in a by­
law, the shareholders can subsequently change it by a shareholder­
adopted bylaw regardless of board oppos i tion. 7" 
There are also mechanisms that provide for a degree of i nformal 
entrenchment. Thus, for exampl e ,  the various and sundry p rovisions 
that make i t  more or less diffi cult for a majori ty of sh areholders to ef­
fect change can all be unders tood as providing a degree of entrench­
ment These provisions include governan ce rules tha t  require advance 
notice of shareh older proposals, provisions eliminating shareh olders' 
abil i ty to act by consent, and adaptive devices, such as shareholder and 
board compositi on and the relative independence of the board .'' '  
There are several lessons to be d rawn from this  b1ief discussion of 
the dimensions of choice in the design of a corporate cons ti tuti o n .  
First, the degree o f  flexibil ity i n  devising a consti tutional governance 
structure is high. Second, whatever terms are chosen, Delaware offers 
both tlexibility with respect to th e degree of en trenchment of those 
terms and permits varying degrees of entrenchmen t for different 
terms .  Third ,  important consti tu tional choices made under Dela1vare 
law are unrelated to control contests . 
3. Entrenching Board Power 
Vvith this brief review of the statutory structure , we now reach the 
question presented to the corporate planner who wants to e n trench 
board power over acquisitions:  How to do so? The short answer given 
by the preceding discussion is that Delaware permits a di zzying Yarie ty 
of options and variations resulting in varying degrees of entrench­
ment 
Among public companies,  several opti ons are commonly em­
ployed.  First, offering th e highest level of entrenchment, a non trivial 
percentage of firms enshrine control in a group of shareholders by 
granting them supervoting righ ts .  Such a structure can enable share­
holders who hold a minority ( economic )  stake in the company to 
" !d. § 242. 
'' lrl. Staggered board p rovisions are in fac t fo und both in the charter and in th e 
bylaws. Tele phone Conversation wi th Mic h ael Klausn er,  Professor of Busi n ess and 
Law, Stanford Law School (Aug. 29,  200 l ) . 
''' See Kahan & Rock, sujna n o te 43,  a t  896-99 ( cle.-;crihing the adjustme n t  h\· "mar­
ket partici pan ts . . .  to D el aware takeO\ er Ia\\. th rough [suc h ]  aclapti\ e de\ i ces" ) .  
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maintain con trol indefinitely. Second, a staggered board wi th a three­
year term gives a determined board somewhat more than a year of 
breathing space to fend off a hosti le  bidder. Third,  nonstaggered 
boards can be protected against midterm removal by denying share­
holders the right to act by written consent or to cal l  a special meeting. 
Though the members of such boards can , in  theory, s ti l l  be removed 
wi thout cause, shareholders lack the effective opportuni ty to exercise 
this right. Finally, offering minimal entrenchment, a significant mi­
nori ty of fi rms enable shareh olders to remove the board at any tim e  
midterm a n d  with minimal delay by permi tting board members to b e  
removed without cause and by gi,ing shareholders the po·wer e i ther to 
act by wri tten consent or to call a special meeting. The l arge m� ori ty 
of firms , when they go publi c ,  opt for one of the two i n termediate 
consti tutional structures , which provide some, but less than complete,  
en tren ch1nen t .  x" 
4 .  Corporate Consti tuti onal In terpre tation 
Suppose a firm has adopted some partic ular govern an ce structure . 
vVhen this governance structure is chall enged, how do courts resolve 
the challenge? This is a question of "corporate constitutional in ter­
pretation."  
Th e key to u nderstanding how Delaware courts in terpret corpo­
rate constitutional documents is to take seriously th e oft-repeated 
statement that  they view the charter as a con trac t among the share­
holders :  
Corporate charters and by·laws are con tracts among the share h o l de rs of 
a corporation and the gene ral rules of con trac t in teq)retation are h e l d  
t o  apply . ln t h e  i n te rpretati on o f  c harte r a n d  by-law proYisions,  " [ c] ourts 
m us t  give effect  to the i n te n t  of the parties as revealed bv t h e  bn guage 
ofthe 
.
certificate and the circumstances sunounding its cn:ation and adop-
. .,K \ 
tlon. 
"' .)pp JOH:'\ C. CO.\TES IV, [\:PL\1>:!:'\C \r\RI.-\TIO:'\ ! :"\ T\hEOVER D EFE:'\SES: 
F.\ILL' RE I :'\ Ti l E  CORPOR.\TE L\\1' l\L\RKFT ( HarY. Ltw Sch .  John !VI . Ol in  Ctr. for Law, 
Econ . ,  8..: Bus. , Discussion Paper No. 297, 2000) ,  available at http://www.tm·.harvarcl. 
edu/ p rograms/olin_center/ ( p nwidi n g  data on d e fe nses bv top !all' firms at t h e  IPO 
s tage and explai n i n g  the impo rt of various defenses) . 
" 
Cen taur Partn ers . IV \ .  Nat ' !  I n t e rgroup, I n c  . .  582 A.'::!d 9':2 3 ,  9':28 ( D e l .  1 99 0 )  
( q uoting Waggon e r \'. Las ter.  5K 1 A.2d ! 1 2 7, ! 1 3-J. ( Del .  ! 990) ( c i t a t i o n s  omi tted ) ) ;  seP 
also Berlin \·. Emerald P<t rt n ers ,  5.52 A .2d 482 , 488 ( De l .  1 9R9) ( " I n  examin in g  th e pro­
\·isi ons of a certificate of incorporation , courts applv t h e  rules of con tract  i n terp re ta­
ti o n  [ . . . .  a n d ]  th e best evi dence of t h e  i nt e n ti o n  of the parties is o ft e n  foun d  i n  the 
express la nguage of a wri t ten con t ract." ( c i tations omi tted ) ) ;  Fran k i n o \·. Gleason ,  :\ o .  
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From this contractualist perspective ,  default rules assume substan­
tial importance.  Under D elaware lav.r, when sh areholder approval is 
required, a maj o ri ty of shares present ·will generally control.�� vVhen a 
superm� ority provision appears in  the charter,  i t  wil l  be enforced 
and, under an express stat utory provision , cannot i tself be rnodifi e d  by 
a lower majori ty.x l  But  other departures from simple m� ority rule re­
quire a clear s tatement and will be narrowly i n terpreted.K '  For exam­
ple,  in Frankino v. Gleason,"'
'• the board , faced ·wi th a challenge from a 
disaffected maj ority stockholder, adopted a bylaw purporting to re­
quire an eigh ty percen t  supermaj ori ty vote to amend the bylaw gov­
erning board size. "''i In his  opinion, Chancellor Chandl er  avoided the 
h ard and unsettled questionx' of whether a board can validly adop t  a 
supemuj ority bylaw. Instead , h e  held that, because the superm aj o ri ty 
bylaw did not explicitly require a supermajori ty to be amended i tself, a 
1 7,399, 1 999 Del .  Ch .  LEXIS 2 1 9 ,  at '� 1 2- 1 4  (Del .  Ch .  1 999)  (u ti l izing contract i n ter­
p re tation principles to assess the val idity of a bylaw provis ion in a company's cert i ficate 
of i ncorporation ) ,  rt{f'd sub nom. McNamara v. Fra n kino,  744 A.�d 988 ( D e l .  1 999) ; 
Morris  v. Am. Pub. Uti ls .  Co. , 1 22 ,-\. 696. 70 1 (De l .  C h .  1 92Ci )  ( noting tha t  th e terms of 
the contract benveen shareholders are determined by ' 'the appropriate p rovisions of 
the certificate of i ncorporation and the law of the state " ) ; ROD\L-\"' VVARD , JR., EDWARD 
P. WELCI ! & A:\DREW j. TLREZ\-:'\, FOIJ-\. 0:\ THE D EL\\1':\RE GE:\ERAL CORPOR.ATIO:\ 
LAW s 1 02 . 1 6  (4th eel. 1 999)  (stating  that certificates of incorporation are to be con­
strued as con tracts ) .  
'� D E L  CODE A:\:\. tit. 8 ,  § 2 Hi ( 2 )  ( 200 1 ) ; In I P  Explorer Pipeli ne C o . ,  78 1 A.2d 
705, 7 1 4  (De l .  Ch. 200 1 ) .  
,;:� DEI .. CODE A:\:--.: . tit . 8 ,  § 242 (b ) (4 )  ( 200 1 ) ;  sre also Cen/our Par/nns, 592 A.2cl at  
928-29 (upholding a supermajority requ i rement to  amend a superm;;�ori ty charter 
provision in accordance wi th the " i nt e n tion of the s tockholders who adopted these 
provisions" ) ;  Fran kino, 1 999 Del .  Ch . LEX IS  2 1 9 , at * 1 6  ( noti ng that a supermajori ty 
prm·is ion in  a charter cannot be amended by a "bare m<�ority w te'') ; Sel lers v. Joseph 
Bancroft & Sons Co. ,  2 A.2d 1 08 ,  1 1 3 ( De l .  Ch . 1 938 ) ( rejecting an amendment to a 
superm;�ori ty provision passed by only a bare majority) . No equ ivalent statutory p rovi­
sion applies to superm<�ority requiremen t<; relati ng to b\·law provisions. 
"·' See Standard Power & Ligh t Corp. v. Reid Im·. Assoc . ,  I nc . ,  5 1  A.2d 5 72,  576 
( De l .  1 947)  ( " I f  [s imple m;�oritv] rule is not to be obsetwd, then the charter provision 
must not be couched in ambiguous language, rather the language employed m us t  be 
posi ti\·e, expl ic i t ,  c lear and readily understandable and suscep tible to but  one reason­
able in terpretation, which  would i ndicate bevon d  doubt that the rule was in tended to 
be abrogated." ( ci ta tion omitted) ) .  
s ·, 1 999 Del .  Ch .  LEXIS 1 9. at ''' 1 2- 1 4. K•i 
lrl. at ''' l -2 .  
"' 
Ser Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 7 7 1  A.2d 293, 343 n . 1  U ( Del .  Ch. 2000 ) ( decl in­
ing to evaluate the l egali ty of a supermajority bylaw but describing such a bvlaw as p re­
sen ting a novel issue in Delaware corporate law) . 
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simple m�j ori ty of shareholders could remove the supermaj mity bylaw 
and then proceed, by simple m aj ority, to amend the oth e r  bylaws .�� 
A second key feature of Delaware corp orate consti tu tional in ter­
pretation is respect for the special authority of the charter. Thus,  in 
Quichturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro,"'�' the Delaware Suprem e Co urt 
rej ected a poison pill that could not be redeemed by a new board for 
six months after being elected ( a  "no hand" or "slow h and" poison 
pill)  on the grounds that, under section 14 1 ( a) , any such limitation 
on the board ' s  authori ty would h ave to be placed in the certificate of 
• • � H )  
m corpora.uon . 
Together, these 1:\vo i n terpretative commitments produce a fun­
damen tal distinction within Delaware takeover j urisprudence.  vVhen 
directors unilaterally adopt bylaws in response to a control threat, the 
response will be subj ect to a Unocal Corp. v. 1\!Iesa Petroleum Co.' ' 1  analysis 
and,  depending on whe th e r  they affect the voting process, possibly 
also a Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp.' '� analysis . !\:', By contrast, when the 
board and the shareh olders bilaterally adopt a defensive charter pro­
vision , neither Unocal nor Blasius scrutiny applies .''� 
"' 
Fm nkino, 1 999 Del .  Ch .  LEXIS 2 1 9, at '' 1 3- 1 4. For another very in teresting ex­
ample of narrow interpretation of departures from m�jority rule, see In re l:'xplorer Pipr­
lin r  Co. , 7t H A.2d at 7 1 4- 1 8, in which the chancel)' court  strictly construed the terms of 
a supermajori ty provision. Ser also D ousman v. Kobus, 2002 vVL 1 33562 1 ,  at  "'::i (Del .  
Ch . June 6, 2002) ( holding that p la inti ffs stated a cognizable claim that supermajority 
bylaw was amended by implication ) ;  Harrah's  Entm ' t, I nc .  v. JCC Holding Co. ,  802 
A.2d 294, 3 1 6- 1 7  ( Del .  Ch.  2002) ( interpreting complicated and ambiguous classified 
board structure bylaws to preserve ordinary shareholder's right to nominate directors ) . 
"'' 
72 1 A.2cl l 28 1  ( Del .  1 998) . 
'" '  !d. at 1 29 1 .  Similarly, i n  Carmody v. Toll Bros. , 723 A.2d 1 1 80 ,  1 1 90-9 1 ( Del .  Ch. 
] 998 ) ,  Chancellor jacobs r�jected a "deaclhand" poison pi l l  on the grounds that, under 
section 1 4 1  ( d ) ,  any distinction in the voting power or rights among directors must be 
set forth in th e charter. Indeed, the fact  that Delaware law perm i ts such distinctions 
only b:· charter provis ion, while Georgia permits such distinctions in the charter or by­
l aws, prm idecl the basis for distinguishi ng Invacare C01j1. v. Healthdyne Trrhnologies, Inc. , 
968 F. Supp.  1 578, 1 5 8 1  ( N . D .  Ga. 1 997) , the Georgia case upholding a "dead hand" 
pil l .  S'ep Cannady, 723 A.2d at 1 1 92 n.38 ( distinguishing fnvacare on the grounds that  
the "relevant Delaware corporate statuto!)' scheme . . .  diflers materially from that of 
Georgia'' ) . 
' ' 1  SrP 493 A.2d 946, %5 (Del .  1 985) ( holding that a board 's  decision to adopt a 
defen sive measure m us t  be "reasonable in relation to the threat posed") . 
··� See 564 A.2d 65 l ,  662 n .5  ( Del .  Ch.  1 988) ( perm i tting a board to i nterfere with 
sh areh older franchise only under "extreme circumstances") . 
" ;  
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 7 7 1  A.2d 293, 320 ( Del .  Ch. 2000 ) . 
' ' 1  SPP Williams v. Geier, 67 1 A.2d 1 368, 1 3  76 ( Del .  1 996) ( indicating that neither a 
Unoml nor a Blasius analysis applies without unilateral board action) . 
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Note the literalism and absence of pate rnalism in the Delaware 
approach. The s tatutory structure provides a wide range of options 
with respect to a wide range of properties. Parties can deviate, eve n 
substantially, from the statutory defaults, although they may n eed to 
make their choices clear. This largely contractual approach, as we wil l  
see ,  bas implications for the treatme nt o f  interactions among provi­
sions as well as the treatme nt of provisions over time. 
IV. Is THERE A SINGLE BEST PARAD IGM? THE Ei\IPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In this Part, we turn to the empirical evidence regarding the effect 
of governance structures designed to entrench board power. \t\!e dis­
cuss the governance terms at the time of a firm 's  IPO, the effect of 
staggered boards on hostil e bids, the relation between poison pills and 
takeover premia, legislatively imposed staggered boards, and share­
holder voting on staggered boards. vVe fin d  that the evidence is most 
consistent with the view that different governance structures are desir­
able for different companies and that intem1ediate levels of board 
power may well be supe1ior for a majority of companies. 
A. A ntitakeover Provisions at IPOs 
At the time of their IPO, most companies opt for a Madisonian 
power structure that lies between Jacksonian shareholde r  choice and 
Hamiltonian board veto. According to an empirical study by Robert 
Daines and Michael Klausner, about 40% of IPO companies have 
staggered boards.'''' Another 20% do not have staggered boards, but 
make it difficult to remove directors between annual meetings.'"' Only 
about 10% of the companies have stricter antitakeover defenses, such 
as dual class stock,�'' and none restricts the ability of boards to adopt a 
poison pil! .�'x The remaining 30% of the companies permit removal of 
directors between annual meetings, thereby basically adopting a 
shareholder choice regime. These choices support the Madisonian 
-- -- - --- ----- ---- - --- ---
, ,., .'iN' Dai n es & Klausner, suj;ra n o te 33, at �6 tbl .2  ( i n dicating tha t  44% of a sam­
ple of 3 1 0  IPOs in 1 9�4-97 hac! s taggered boards) :  sPe also Coates, supm note 33, a t  
1 353,  1 376 (34% of a s<nnp1e o f  1 62  I POs in  1 99 1-92 ancl 66% of a sample of 1 62 I POs 
in 1 9�8) ; La ura Casares Field & Jon athan M. Karpoff, TakPuver De[Pnses of IPO Finns, 5 7  
J F i n .  1 807 ,  1 86 1  tbl . ! I  (2002) ( 3 6 %  of 1 0 1 9  I POs i n  1 9St-;-92) . 
. . , ; 
Telephone C:om e rsation wi th Michael Klausner, Professor of Busi n ess & Lm·, 
Stanford Lm· School (Aug. 2�. 200 l ) . 
' '' See Daines & Klausne r, .lujJm n ote 33, at 96 tbl .2  ( 6% have dual cbss s tock out of "  
sample of 3 1 0  J POs i n  1 994-97) . 
;•x fr1. at 95. 
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view that different governance structures may be appropriate for dif­
feren t con1 pani es. ! l\ l  
For a long time,  it was widely believed that the governance struc­
ture at the IPO stage re±1ected the terms that maximize company 
value . 1 1 10 In  the 1 980s, mainstream academic opinion took it as a given 
that governance rules set at the time of an IPO were l ikely to be eHi­
cient and distrusted rule changes after a company had gone public 
( "midstream" changes ) . 1 0 1 Academic opinion s tarted to shift in the 
late 1 990s. 1 0� There were several factors behind this shift. First, the 
findings that IPO charters regularly included anti takeover provisions 
highlighted the inconsistency of two cherished academic \iews: the 
efficiency of the IPO market and the inefficiency of antitakeover pro­
VISIOns. 1 0:1 Second, increased s tock ownership by insti tutional investors 
� �� I 
Daines and Klausner try to test the ,-,d i d i ty of t h e  barga i n i n g  h ypo thesis b1· ex-
a m i n i ng wh ether the a n ti takeo1·er cle1·ices <�re correl ated to th e average n umber of par­
t i es maki ng acq uisi tion bids i n  a firm's  h istory. They argue that a target needs less 
bargaining p ower \\·hen it c an e n tice a cmnpeting bid and use th e aYerage n u m ber o f  
bidders i n  a target ' s  i n dustry as a proxy for com peti ti o n .  They fin d  tha t a n ti takenYe r 
defenses a re posi tivelv correlated 1\·i th t h e  ;n·erage n u mber of b idde rs, l\'h ich is i n con­
sistent with th eir interp reta tion of the ba rga i n in g  powe r theory. Howe1·e r, as s ubse­
quen t!\· discussed.  the extent of p o ten tia l com petit ion is  only one of se1 era! f<K to rs that  
determines the optimal sel l ing stra tegy, and th e average n u mber o f  b idders i n  an i n ­
dus try i s ,  a t  best, a ro ugl1 proxy t o r  t h e  degree o f  compe tition for a specific ta rge t . Sn: 
infm text accom panying n o tes 1 1 :2- 1 :1  ( discussing and eval uati n g  Daines and Klausner's  
conclusion regarding the frequen cy of s tagge red boards in relat ion to the n umber of 
firms making acquisition b i ds) . 
1 1 1 1 1  
See Daines & Klausner, .llljJ/n note 33, a t  83 (n oting the ''widelv helcl 1·ie11· [ ]  . . . 
that firms at the i n i tial  public offering (IPO) stage estab l ish efficient govern ance st ru c­
tures .. ) .  1 " 1  
.s·ee, e.g. , Lucian A. Bebchuk, Foreward , The I>e!Jate 011 Contmrlua/ Fiudo111 in Cine 
j}()m/e Law, 89 COLL'\1. L. REv. 1 395,  1 399- l- 1-08 ( 1 989)  ( argui n g  that  i n i tial  charter 
terms are m ore l i kely than midstream changes to be nefit shareholders ) ; Ron alcl .J. Gil­
son . Evaluating Dual Class Cummun .')lock: The Re/!!"{l(tJ ite of Substitutes, 7 3  V.\. L. REV. 807, 
808- 1 1 ( 1 98 7 )  ( t�tvori ng regulation of d ual c lass common stock u n l ess estab l i shed � tt  
! PO ) ; Gilso n ,  suj11 a n o te 6, a t  822-27 ( favoring l i m i ts on share h o l de rs '  abil ity w ap­
prm·e charter amendments based on the argume n t  that sh areho l ders a re ignora n t ) ; 
Jeffrey T\' .  Gordo n ,  The J'v!an drr lmy .'itmclll ll' of Cmpomle 1-rrw, 89 COLL\1. L. REV. 1 5-l-9.  
F i55-62 ,  1 57:1-70 l l 989) ( arguing that c h art e r  p rO\·isi on s at th e I P O  s�age a re l i keh to 
be "wealth-maximizing" l\·h i le l<tter amendmen ts ma1· be "weal th-reduci ng" d u e  to op­
portun ism by company insiders ) .  
1"� SeP Kah an & Rock, sujHO note 43,  at 887 n . 7 7  ( rem ctrk i ng o n  that sh ift) . Epi to­
mizing h ow much acade mic opinion h as mm·ecl, Bernard Black a n d  Rei n i e r  Kr<takman 
recen tly remarked that the fact  that staggered board prm·isions are incluclecl in ! PO 
charters, rath er than adopted m i dstre a m ,  .. weaken.-; th e claim th a t  theY are sensi b le 
goYe rn an cc rules ."  Black & Kra<tkman,  sujna n ote 6, a t  :)62. 
1 " ;  ,'iee D a i n es & K.lausner, Slljn o n ote 33,  a t H:�-86 ( n (J t ing this i n consistency) . 
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arguably improved the quality of voting decisions. 1 1H Finally, academ­
i cs noticed that, although investors regularly purchased shares of 
companies wi th anti takeover provisions at the IPO stage, I l l'• they often 
voted against ne\v antitakeover provisions midstream. 106 Thus,  inves­
tors ' voting decisions accord more than their buying decision with the 
Jacksonian view of the correct governance regime. 
vVe are sympathetic  to the notion that changes in stock ownership 
have improved the overall reliability of shareholder voting decisions 1 u7 
and do not claim that the governance s tructures adopted at IPOs 
amount to conclusive proof of which regime is optimal . 1 11H But, unlike 
the Jacksonians, we continue to believe that the IPO charter terms 
provide substantial evidence of appropriate governance structures . 
B .  The Incidence of Staggered Board Provisions 
In the 1 990s, the percen tage of IPO firms with staggered boards 
increased.  John Coates reports that this percentage grew from 34% in 
1 99 1  and 1992 to 66% in 1 998. 1 1 1,1 Consistent  with such an increase , 
D aines and Klausner, who examined firms going public fro m  1 994 to 
,...., o/c b d 
1 1 0 1 99 1 ,  report that 43.4 o of IPO firms had staggered oar s .  
The increase o f  staggered board provisions dming t h e  1 990s is 
consistent with a thesis that we have developed in another article :  that 
--- - - -·-- --�· 
1" 1 
See Edward B .  Rock, ]'he Logic and ( Uncertain ) Signijicanre of Inslilutional Share­
lwldPr A.ctivism, 79 CEO. LJ 445, 447-5 1 ( 1 99 1 ) ( describi n g  examples of i n formed ac tiv­
ism bv institutional shareholders) . 
1 , ;-, SPe Daines & I<Jausner, sujJia note 33, a t  84, 1 1 0- 1 3 (documenting that most 
companies have anti takeover provisions in  th e i r  charter 1vhen they go p u b l i c  a n d  rarely 
opt out of debult an ti takeover provisions in the law, and remarki ng o n  earl i e r  bel iefs 
by commentators that fi rm s  go public i n  an easy-to-acquire form and that  defensive 
provisions are added later) . 1'"; See :V!i chael I<Jausn e r, Institutional .)'!utrPiwldns, Private Equity, and Antitaheover 
Protertion at !he /PO Stage, 1 5 2  U .  PA. L. REV. 755 ,  756, 784 (2003) [hereinafter I<Jaus­
ner,  Private Equity] ( suggesting that institutional investors should oppose a n ti takeover 
pre>visions in I PO ch arters j us t  as they oppose such p rovis ions in shareholder \'Otes ) .  
1 ' ' '  SPe Rock, supm n o te 1 04,  at 448-49 ( '"As shareholclings become c o n c e n trated i n  
fell'er a n d  more sophisti cated hands,  i t  is  t e m p ting t o  concl ude that share h olders wil l  
fi nal lv b e  able to overcome [col lective act ion problen1s ] "  and that "the inst i tuti on a l  
i twestor \vould s e e m  t o  have b o th t h e  incenti\·e and t h e  abil i ties  t o  constrain manage­
ment .  Recent devel opments p ro1·ide some enco uragemen t for these hopes . '' ) .  11 1' See Lucian A. Bebch uk,  VI'71J Fin7is A.dojJt A ntitakf'over Arrangem!'nts, 1 52 U. PA. L. 
REV. 7 1 3, 7 1 4-28 (2003) ( noting that imes tors acce p t  structures at the IPO stage that 
wendel be rejected later) ; Klausner, Prh,ate Fquity, sujna note 1 0 6, at 768-69 ( n oting a 
si m ilar result  f(Jr institutional investors) . 111!1 
Coates, sujml n o te 3:\ ,  at 1 353 ,  1 376. 
1 1 1 1  
D a i n e s  & I<Ja usner,  sujmr note :n,  at 96 tbl . � .  
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companies have successfully pursued vanous adaptive devices-spe­
cifically, more independent boards and stock option-based compensa­
tion-to ameliorate the conflicts of interests between managers and 
shareholders when faced with a takeover bid. 1 1 1 Given these devices, it 
becomes desirable for more companies to adopt governance terms 
through which shareholders entrench board power to a greater de­
gree .  
Among IPO firms, Daines and Klausner find that staggered boards 
are more common for compani es that operate in an industry with a 
higher number of firms making acquisition bids (relative to the total 
number of firms operating in that industry) , and interpret that find­
ing as inconsistent with their  bargaining power hypothesis. 1 1 �  They ar­
gue that the relative number of parties making bids is  a proxy for po­
tential competi tion among bidders and that bargaining power is more 
important (and staggered boards therefore should be more cmnmon) 
when there is less potential competi tion . 1 1 :1 
· 
One problem with Daines and Klausner's interpretation is that the 
relative number of parties making bids is only a very rough proxy for 
potential competi tion . 1 1 1 Instead, that number reflects industry take­
over volume , relative to the number of firms operating in the industry. 
Industry takeover vol ume, in turn , is l ikely to be correlated with the 
probability of a synergy-producing takeover, where the division of 
gains between the bidder and the target shareholders is l ike ly to be an 
important issue . It may therefore be desirable for target shareholders 
to entrench board power in order to obtain a higher share of these 
gains. Viewed from this perspective , the correlation between stag­
gered board provisions and the number of parties making bids in the 
firm's industry is consistent with the Maclisonian view that entrench­
ing board power may be desirable because i t  enhances a board ' s  abil­
ity to pursue a selling strategy. 1 1 '' 
1 1 1  Kahan & Rock ,  sujmz note 43; see also Cuban Subramani an ,  The !JisajJjJParing 
Delaware l:jfect, JL. ECO!\'. & ORG. ( forthcoming Apr. 2004) (manuscrip L  at 1 8-2 1 . on 
file 1vith authors) (discussing how stock option compensation may bri ng managers· 
i n terests in takeover situations more in l ine  with those of shareholders ) .  
1 1 � Daines & Klausner, sujJ-ra note 33, at 1 03-04. 1 \ ''1 -
· · Daines & Klausner, supra note 33,  at 98. 
1 1 1 
Another problem is  that poten tial competition is only one of many factors that 
bear on the desirab i l i ty of entrenching board power to enable boards to pursue a sell­
ing strategy effectively. See .mjna text accompanying note 47 (discussing se1·eral factors 
that determine the optimal a l location of decision-making power) . 
1 1 '' By contrast, industry takeon:�r \ Oiume is less l i kely to he conelatecl ,,· ith disci­
p l inary takeovers. In discipl inary takeovers, the di1·ision of gains bet11'een the biclcler 
and th e target shareholders may also be an issue. Hul\·e,·er, with respect to such 
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C .  Tlze Effect of Staggered Boards on Hostile Bids 
[Vol .  1 52 :  473 
In a recent empi1ical study of h ostile acquisition offers, Lucian 
Bebchuk, John Coates, and Guhan Subramanian (BC&S) find that 
staggered boards significantly increase the likelihood of a target re­
maining independent and conclude that staggered boards harm 
shareholders. 1 1 1; 
The BC&S data do not warrant this conclusion .  Hosti le bids are 
made after consensual negotiations have broken down. If s taggered 
boards are an effective bargaining device, by making the board 's  re­
fusal to accept an offer more credible ,  it necessarily fol lows that, once 
negotiations have broken down, companies with staggered boards are 
more l ikely to remain independent than those without s taggered 
boards. The BC&S results thus suggest  that staggered boards are ef­
fective ; but they do not suggest that they are undesirable . ' ' ' 
To determine whether boards use their bargaining power to raise 
acquisition premia, one needs to examine deals where the bidder and 
target reached an agreement-that is, "friendly" deals-which are not 
included in the BC&S sample. 1 1 x The number of friendly deals dwarfs 
the number of hostile bids. ' 1 , 1 Thus, even if staggered boards have 
only a minuscule effect on the target's ability to obtain a better offer 
in friendly deals ,  the net effect of such improvement is likely to out­
weigh the loss from hostile bids blocked by staggered boards . 1 �0 
takeoYers, agen cy costs are l i kelv to be h igh and may m a ke a commitm e n t to board 
\ C to undesirabl e .  ! I I i , _ . 
BC&-S, sujna no te 6, at 89 1 ,  9::>0. 
1 "  The BC&S authors abo adduce evidence that  the rejected h osti le offer often is 
ahoYe the i ndepe n dent value o f  the company. See BC&S, sujJm n o te 6,  a t  926 ( finding 
that the a\·erage f inal  hid that a host i le  bi dder makes i s  43.2% over th e p re-bi d  m arket 
p ri ce ) .  This,  of course,  is  consistent ,,·i th swggered boards being used to enable a 
board w pursue a sel l ing strategy more e ffectively. .'-iee .\ ujJI/1 text accompanying note 
1 1 1  ( d iscussing h ow staggered boards have been adopted to amel i orate c o n fl icts of in­
te rest between man agers and shareholders when p resented wi th a h ostile b id ) .  
1 1 '  .'iee Mark Gordo n ,  ]'akr'nvrr Defl'nses Wrnk Is That Such a Bad Thing?, 5 5  ST.-\\:. L. 
REV. 8 1 9 ,  822-24 (2002) ( arguing that the BC&S study used an overly na rrow data set 
b,· l i rn i ting the data to h osti le transactions) . l l '.l s· . r . 1 94 96 , eP 1 111m text accompanymg notes _, -- ) . 
: :> r ;  With respect to h ostile offers, the BC&S auth ors repo rt that acquis i t ion p remia 
�1re ti,·e percen t  h i gh e r  when the target h as a staggered board then \vh e n  i t  does  not. 
BC&S, supra n o te 6, at 935-36. v\'h i le the difference i n  premia is n o t  statistically sig­
n i ficant.  the BC&S sample of successful hosti le offers is  very small  (seven i m olvi ng 
companies with staggered boards, fifteen for companies wi th out) , id. at 930 fig.3 ,  and 
their test thus lacks power. At the ,.e l)' least, th ese data do not show t h a t  boards Jail to 
use the bargai n i n g  power confe rred on them bv staggered board proYis ions to raise 
premia.  
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Indeed, perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the B C&S study is 
that the number of failed h os tile bids involving companies ·with stag­
gered boards is so small . ' � '  Between 1 996 and 2000, the period of th e 
BC&S s tudy, there were over 3,000 acquisiti ons, ' �� of which about half 
involved companies with s taggered boards. ' �:• The BC&S authors ex­
amined the 92 h ostile bids during the period, of which 45 involved ef­
fective staggered boards. ' �·' O f  these 45 bids, 1 1  did not result i n  the 
acq uisition of the target. ' �'· \Nhat one really wants to know-and what 
the BC&S data do not tell us-is whether bargaining b reakdmv11 is 
more common with a staggered board than without (which one woul d  
expect) , and whether the benefit t o  shareholders i n  the deals that do 
occur offsets any losses to shareholders in deals that do not occur. 
D .  The Ejject of Poison Pills on Takeover Premia 
Several studies have found that acquisition premia are signifi­
cantly higher for targets with poison pills than for targets without 
pil ls . ' �'; At fi rst  blush , these s tudies present a theore tical con undrum : 
since virtually every company can adopt a pill whenever i t  wants, the 
actual adoption of a pill does not increase management's  bargaining 
power . ' :!' But while pil ls  do not signify increased bargaining power� the 
adoption of a pill signals that management is read)' to use this power to 
extract a higher premium ( at the risk of defeating a bid) .
1 �� 
Consis­
tent with this interpretation,  surp rise pil ls-pills that were not  pre­
dicted on the basis of gene ral company characteristi cs-and " morning 
after" pills-which are adopted close to the time of a bid-have a par­
ticularly pronounced positive impact on acquisition premia. 
1 �\, 
Even 
1 � 1  
!d. 
� �� .)'pe MERCFRSTAT, :VlERCERSTAT REVIE\N 6 (200 1 )  (summ ari 1. i n g  t r<tnsactions i n-
\·olvi ng public  companies from 1 996-2000) .  1 � 1  5;eP BC&S, supm note 6,  at �2n tbl .2  (showi ng 60.9% with a s tagge red hoard ) . 
1 � 4  !d. 
1 :.: :·, [ l O q () f� 9 r. .  a t  :; : >  1 g . :1 .  
, �, ;  See Robert Com m e n t  & G. \Ni l l iam Schwert, Poison u r  Ploabu ? �:·l,irlmre 1111 tlu' 
DrlmPnrP and Wmlth E!fnts oj' Modern A ntitakeova J\.fmswPs, ;)SJ . J .  F t :\ .  Eco :\ .  ;) , ;�o ( 1 99'1 )  
( i n terpreting d a ta t o  s h ow t h a t  both cond i tional a n d  uncondit i < ) l lal takeO\·e t ·  premi<t 
are h igher with a pi l l  i n  place ) :  GEORCESO:\ & Co . ,  POISO:\ PILL l \ I PACT STUn.' I ( \lar. 
3 1 ,  1 988) ; GEORC ;£SO:\ & CO . ,  PO ISO:\ P I LL l\ IPACT STL'DY II  (Oct.  3 1 ,  J 98t\) . 
! :.! 7  See Bebc h uk, sujHa note 3 1 ,  a t  1 009-l 0 ( n oting that pi l l  s tu d i es do n o t  show an 
i ncrease i n  management 's  bargai ning power to resist h ostile b i ds ) . 
' �' .See.John C. Coates IV, Toheover Defenses in the Sh adow rif the Pi/!: A Critique of tlu' 
Scirn tijlc Evidrna. 79 TEX. L. REV. 2 7 1 ,  30 1 ( 2000) ( noting that  p i l l s  m av se n·e as resis­
tance signals) . 
' �' '  Com me n t  & Schwert, sujna n ote ] 26,  at ;)6-37. 
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though these pills also reduce the likelihood of a bid ' s  succeeding, 
their net impact on target shareholders is posi tive . no This suggests 
that, on average , boards resist bids ( as evidenced by pill  adoptions) 
when doing so benefits shareholders .  The pill  studies thus support 
the conclusion that shareholders can benefit by granting the board 
some power to resist bids .  
E .  The Effect of Legislatively Imposed Staggered Boards 
In 1 990, Massachusetts legislatively imposed staggered boards on 
all Massachusetts public  companies,  even if the charters of these com­
panies provided for annual elections of the whole board . J :\ 1  Studies of 
this Massachusetts legislation have shown that the stock price of Mas­
sachusetts companies that did not already have staggered boards de­
clined. 1 :1� The result of these studies is consistent vvith our argument 
that shareholder choice represents a p lausible governance structure 
and that staggered boards are not universally desirable. Forcing stag­
gered boards onto companies that did not opt to include staggered 
board provisions in their charter should thus be expected to reduce 
company value .  
F .  Shareholder Votes on Staggered Boards 
Votes on staggered board proposals occur in two settings : when 
boards recommend amending the charter to establish staggered 
boards (when the company does not have one ) ; and when sharehold­
ers put forward a precatory proposal recommending that the board 
act to repeal a staggered board (when the company has one ) . 
Since the late 1 980s , the number of board proposals to establish 
staggered boards has substantially declined. 1 :1:1 This decl ine is clue, at 
least in part, to managerial fear that shareholders 'vil l  not vote in favor 
-- ---- ----------------
1111 
!d. at 3 1  tbl .4 .  36 .  1 1 1  .\ee ROBERT M .  D.-\E\ES, D O  CLASSIFIED BOARDS AFFECT FIR\! \.'- \I .UC:" T.\KEO\'ER 
D EFE:\'SES AHER THE POISO:\ PILL l l -1 2 (working paper) (disc ussing the emlu tion of 
i'vlass. House Bi1 1 5556 and i ts  effect on Massachusetts firms) . I I� 
frf. at l fi- 1 7  tbJ .2 .  1 :1:1 
Klausner, PriNlle Equity, sujHa note 1 06 ,  a t  759 tb1 .2 .  U n til the 1 980s, when a 
sign ifican t n umber of p roposals to establish s taggered boards \Yere made, such propos­
als had no sign ificant e ffect  on share price. See Coates, suj;m n o te 1 28, at 3 1 7-2:1 
(summarizing resuiL� of event studies) . 
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of such proposals . 1 11  In contrast, precatory proposals seeki n g  to repeal 
staggered boards have increased both in number and in the share­
holder support they receive. ' 10, In 2000, such proposals on average 
garn ered, for the first time,  the support of more than fifty percent of 
the votes cast. ' �' ; Some commentators have interpreted this evidence 
to sh ow th at staggered board provisions are undesirable and only sur­
vive because the board refuses to heed shareholder wishes. 1 :17 
The shareholder voting record stands in apparent  contrast to the 
sign ifican t  percentage of IPO charters that provide for staggered 
boards. But both the voting record and,  obviously, the I PO evidence 
are consistent with the view that staggered boards are desirable for 
some, b ut not all ,  companies.  
Take first the evidence regarding shareholder resolutions to re­
move staggered boards. According to the I nvestor Responsibi l i ty Re­
search Center, which collects data on shareholder proposals for two 
th o usand companies, on average only about fifty proposals  to remove 
I '�' staggered boards are made per year. · · Several of these proposals are 
not supported by holders of a maj ori ty of shares voting,  and only a few 
are supported by holders of a m� ority of outstanding sha;es ( the level 
. l '' l l  
of shareholder support required to change the charte r) . · 
u t  .\ee, e.g. ,  Coates, suprn note 1 28 ,  a t  325 (discussing  how the difficu lty of obtain­
ing sh areholder approval of staggered board provisions has led managers to stop pro­
posing such charter amendments) . 
I :\-, BC&S , suj;m note 6, at 900. By con trast, there have been on ly a few share­
holder proposals to make directors more eas i ly removable between annual meetings, 
and the n umber of shareholder proposals directed against poison pi l ls  have declined . 
. '-iPf' Kahan & Rock, sufmt note 43, at 886 n .74 ( " [S] hareholders have made on lv mini­
mal efforts w get companies to adopt charter provisions-allowing shareholders to act 
by wri tten consent or to cal l  special shareholder meetings and making directors re­
movable without cause-that would permit the rep lacement  of direcwrs berween an­
nual meetings . . . .  '' ) ; see also Stuart L. Gil l ian & Laura T. Starks, Cmpomte Covem anu 
Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of lnstitutional Investors, 57 J .  F!:\. EC:O:\. 275,  
2R6 (2000) ( showing that the n umber of shareholder  proposals submitted to e l iminate 
poison p i l ls was 52 in 1 99 1 , 32  i n  1 992, �9 i n  1 993, ancl 1 5  in 1 994) . 
1 :"; See B C&S, supra note 6, at 900 ( 'The average shareholder \'Ote i n  favor of pro­
posals to de-stagger the board i ncreased from 1 6.4% in 1 987 to 52 .7% in 2000." ) . 
u; SeP, e.g. ,  id. at 943-44 (suggesting that shareholders would l ikely refuse to ratif)· 
staggered boards toclav if given the opportuni ty to express their views) .  
l 'Hi 
. , 1V[I C:Hi\.EL KL\ L'S'\ER, l:\ST!Tl'TIO:\.-\L SHAREHOLDERS' SPLIT P E RSO'\ALIT\' 0:\ 
CORPORATE Gm'ER:\:\.'\CE:  Acnn [:\ PROXIES, PASSIVE I '\ I POS 3 tbl .  1 (Nm . 200 1 )  
(Stanford Law & Econom ics Ol in  Working Paper 225 ) ,  available at h ttp:/ / ol i n . stanforcl. 
edu/workingpapers/. 
I :'�' Georgeson Shareholder I nc . ,  2000 An 111wl  Aieeling Season t·Vmp-UjJ: COJjJoJa/e 
Gmwnano' 1 1 - 1 2  fig. 1 4, at  http:/ /www .georgesonshareholder. com/pdf/OOv\'rapUp.pclf 
( reporting vot ing resul b  for 1 9  proposals ,  of which 3 gained support bv a majoritv o f  
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I\1oreover, one needs to be careful in i n terpreting share h older 
Yotes on precatory resolutions.  Shareholders know that th eir  votes are 
o n ly achisory, and they may therefore pay l ittle attention w the issue 
being \'Oted on, or may use th eir votes more to send a message ( of dis­
satisfaction wi th management or ·with the structure of the board) th an 
to affect the substantive issue. 1 40 Indeed, resolutions are often i ntro­
duced at those companies where shareholder dissatisfaction is the 
h ighest. 1 1 1  Thus, shareholder support for proposals i n troduced at 
such companies is  l ikely to be h i gh e r  than shareholder support would 
be for the same resolution were i t  to be i n troduced at an average 
company. Finally, because neither side campaigns heavily on preca­
tory resol utions, the shareh older vote may only be an inaccurate pre­
dictor of how the vote woul d  h ave turned out if  the same resolu tion 
had been binding. 
The reluctance of n onstaggered boards to propose amending the 
ch arter or bylaws to establish a staggered board , in  turn , can b e  cl ue to 
a vari ety of factors . For one, staggered boards are not desirable for all 
companies and are less l i kely to be desirable for those companies that 
have not yet established them. 14� Second ,  individual share h olders 
h<we limited i ncentives to assess information on a voting decision,  
s ince they are aware that their votes are unlikelv to affect the out-, ' I I :' come. · Thus, shareholder votes on staggered boards may be deter-
mined bv whether stao-o-ered boards are on averao·e desirable for , ' D tJ ' D ' 
outstanding sh ares, l l  bv a m <�ori ty of votes cast, and 1 4  by a p l ur al i ty of votes cast) . 
Note that 'vh i l e  several i nstitutional i nvestors h ave s tated pol ic ies opposing s ta ggered 
boards, .IPf, e.g . . The Vanguard Group,  Proxy FotinK Polin. at h ttp:/ /vv\l'w.vanguard. 
cotn /web/ CO!-p c o n te n t/ CorpAb o u tVanguarc\ ProxyVoting.h tml ( last visited Jan. 6, 
�( )();) )  ( "\Ye will generallv support p roposals to cleclass i f)· existing boards . . .  and will 
block effo rts  bv companies to adopt classified board structures ." ) . to our kn owledge 
none h �n·e made substantial e fforts to get compani es to repeal s taggered boards. I n  
other areas. s u c h  effort� h a\·e h ac\ signi fican t success. Sl'l', r'.f!:· · Kahan &: Rock, s·ujJm 
n o te 43, at H�5 n . l l 2 ( describing TIA . A.'s successful cam paign against dead-hand p i l ls ) . 
1 w  Sr'r', e.g . . Li l l i  A. Cordon & John Pound,  lnfonnation ,  Ownflsli ijJ .\'trurtwe, a n d  
S//({ reh oldn \ 'oti Ill{.' J:'viden crjimn ShwPiwldnc.)jJonsorPd CmpomtP Gm,nnancl' ProjJO\als, 48 J .  
F l \: .  b97 ,  7 1 2  ( 1 �93) ( finding th a t  the worse a finn's l o ng-term pe rformance, th e 
h i gher the vme for a shareholder p roposal ) .  
1 1 1 SrY, l'.g. , Jonathan M. Karpoff et a! . ,  Corporate Cmwm a n u' a n d  .Shrutlwlder ln itia­
til'I'S: 1-.'mpiriral hridena, 42 J .  FI:\ . [CO'\. 365, 365 ( 1 996) ( finding that firms attract ing 
gm·ernance pro posals h a\·e poor prior pe rformance ) ; Michael  P. Smith ,  s·ha iFlwldn A r­
th'il lll liy Institution a l  !nvestrm: r,'vidrm ce Jimn CalPI�R\, 5 1  j. Fr\:. ��7 .  232 ( 1 996)  ( report­
i n g  that CalPERS selects targets for gove rnan ce i n i tiatives based on performan c e ) . 
1 1�  
See sujJm Pan IV.E-F. 
1 � . ·. SN' Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan,  A ha me-worh fur A. n a ly:.ing Legal Policy 
Towa rds Proxy Con tests, 78 C.\L L. REV. 1 07 1 ,  1 080-8 1 ( 1 990 ) ( discussing reasons why 
sh areh olders lack p roper incen ti\·es to obtain i nformation on voting decisions ) . 
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those companies that lack them, rather than by wh ether they are de­
sirable for a specific company. Third, boards may be reluctant to put  
forward staggered board proposals that have a signifi cant  chance of 
fail ing because fai lure causes embarrassment, shows a lack of confi­
dence with management,  may signal management's  fear of a hostile 
takeover, and may result  in  putting the company . .  in  play."  Thus, a 
fai l ure to propose establishing a staggered board may be due to un­
certainty over whether the proposal will pass , rather than certai n ty 
that i t  will fail .  Indeed, i n  those instances \Vhere boards p ropose s tag­
gered board amendme n ts ,  th e amendments garner sign i ficant share­
holder support ,  often including a majori ty of vo tes from shareh olders 
unaffiliated with management.  1 44 
V. E:\FORC i �G THE GOVER:\.-\:'K:E CHOICE 
Let us then assume that entrenching board power in general , and 
choosing to have a staggered board in particular, can be a reasonable 
shareh older choice .  This then raises two fundamen tal and related 
questions. Firs t ,  to -vvhat exte n t  will the courts recognize and enforce 
the consti tutional choice,  especial ly when the board i n adverten tly 
failed to close some looph oles i n  implementing i t? Second, what 
about surprises? vVhat is the court ' s  rol e when a pro\·ision , which has 
been adopted during one period,  i n  a specific context, later turns out 
to have different  and unexpected effects? \Ve address these questions 
in turn . 
A. The Problem of SlopjJ)' Implementation 
As discussed earlier,  the choice of a staggered board i s ,  in part, a 
choice by shareholders to en trench the board. In  the s tandard classi­
fied board, adopting a staggered board means that it will take two 
elections for a dissident to elect a maj ori ty of the board. 
But now consider the follmvin g  situation.  A corporate ch arter 
provides for a three-class classified board and authorizes a board of up 
' 1 1  
Fo r example.  a 200 1 prop osal by Ro tary Pcm·e r I n ternational to adop t  a stag­
gered board was apprm·ecl wi th 9,40 1 ,4�:) shares Yotiug in Ll\·or an d 6�.284 aga i nst .  
Ro tary Power l n t ' l  FORM I O-QSB (Sept.  �0.  200 1 ) .  h t tp :/ /mn,•.sec .gm . D i rectors and 
u fticers held 2.6 mill ion shares. !d. A s imilar  proposal hv Hauppa uge D i gi tal receiYed 
:� ,204,409 YOtes in faYo r and 422,02 1 against. but fai l e d  because i ns u ffic i e n t  Yotes .\\ ere 
cast. Hauppage D i gi tal,  I n c .  Form 1 0-Q ( Dec.  3 1 , 200 1 ) ,  h ttp:/ /WI\l\· .sec . gm. Di rec­
tors and o fficers held about 800,000 shares. hi. A p ro posal by SYmme tricom W<lS de­
feated bv 1 0 , �64,842 mtes to 6,52� , 1 5 6 YOtes. Snm11etricom,  I n c .  F o rm 1 0-Q ( D e c .  � l ,  
200 1 ) ,  h t tp :/ h'ww.sec.go1·. D i rectors and officers held about :)00.000 shares. !d. 
5 1 0  UNlv1�RSrJ 'Y OF PENNS 'Yl, VANTA LA W REVIEW [Vol .  1 52 :  473 
to nine members .  The actual size of the board and the designation of 
the class of directors is  through bylaw (and the board is  auth orized by 
the charter to enact bylaws ) . Due to inattention,  the board sets the 
size at five directors divided into three classes. Now along comes a 
bidder, who proposes to contest the election of th e two directors up 
for election at the n ext meeting, to expand the board from five to 
nine,  and to nominate four i ndi,,iduals to fil l  those fou r  newly created 
seats. If the bidder succeeds, i t  will be able to take control of the 
board in one meeting,  despite the p resence of the classified board . 
Suppose the board responds by expanding the size of the board from 
five to seven and elec ting two new directors. In  such a case,  even if 
the bidder vvins the two seats up for elec tion and wins its pro posal to 
expand the board to nine members, it  wil l  sti l l  only end up with fou r  
seats. I s  that board action,  assuming i t  is  in  good fai th ,  valid? 
These facts closely resemble the facts of both Blasius1r, and, the 
more recent,  Liquid Audio, lnr. 1 11 ; These cases present  a situation in 
which a staggered board can be circumven ted by a bidder and is thus 
not an "effec tive staggered board , "  to use Bebchuk, Coates and 
Subramanian 's  phrase . 1 "7 Unintenti onal ly i n effective s taggered boards 
raise a nice question . O n  the one hand, if one interprets the adopti o n  
o f  the staggered board as a shareholder commi tment t o  a governance 
struc ture that requires win ning two contested elections in order to 
gain control ,  then the board ' s  actions can be j usti fied as pro tecting 
and implementing that structure , albeit with a certain tardin ess.  After 
all , had the board been diligent and scrupulous in maintaining the 
governance structure , i t  would have recognized that a classified board 
with five members, when the charter authori zes nine,  is no classified 
board at all . From this  perspective , one could argue that it  i s  better 
that the board create an effective classified board at the las t  minute ,  by 
expanding i ts size to seven and appoin ti n g  two new members, than 
perpetuate i ts earlier mistake . 
On the other han d ,  if one examines only the curren t  time period, 
after the bidder has made a bid, i t  looks l ike the board i s  distorting 
th e outcome of the contest by interfering with share holders '  fran­
chise. The board 's  action , albeit in good faith , is for the purpose of 
preventing the shareh ol ders from electing particular candidates . One 
might, for example, argue that the board is free to expand the board 
-- --··- -· 
, ,  .. 
Blasius I ndus. \. Atlas Corp . .  564 A.2cl 65 1 , 65 1 (Del .  Ch. 1988 ) .  
' ' ' '  \IM Cos. Y. Liquid Audio, Inc . ,  8 1 3 A.2d 1 1 1 8 , 1 1 22 (Del .  2003) .  
1 47 BC&S. sujmr note 6 ,  a t  890. 
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and appoint new directors fifty ·weeks out of the year, but  during the 
two weeks of the election contest, i t  must stay i ts hand.  
I n  Blasius, the Delaware Chan cery Court adopted this second 
view. 1 4� Atlas ' certificate of incorporation provided for a three-class 
classified board. 1 4!> The certificate set the maximum n umber of direc­
tors at fifteen, with the actual size determined by bylaw; the bylaws set 
the size of the board at seven. 1 '0 The ch arter also did not preclude 
shareholders from acting by consent. 1.> I In other words , the classified 
board was not an effective classified board because the board had 
fixed the number of direc tors too low. The bidder launched a con­
sent solicitation to enact a byla\v to expand the size of the board to fif­
teen and to fil l  the eight n ew seats wi th its own candidates. 1 ''1 If suc­
cessful ,  this consent solicitation would have given Atlas'  nominees 
i mmediate control of the board. 1 '.:l To block this even tuality,  the 
board expanded its number from seven to nine, and then appoin te d  
two new directors . 1-,4 
The case thus presented a classic example of a potentially effective 
classified board that failed because the board did not pay attention to 
detail .  The chancery court i mposed a "compelling j usti fication" test 
and erj oined the board 's  defensive action,  concluding that i ts pur­
pose was to interfere with shareholders '  franchise. 1-,-, I n  other words, 
the board, having failed to implement th e shareholders '  governance 
choice, was precluded from doing so later when the governance 
choice actually would have made a difference. 
I n  Liquid Audio, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted a similar 
approac h ,  albeit on an odd factual record . � "· ' ; Unlike Blasius, Liquid 
Audio involved the actions of a board classified by bylaw rather than by 
charter. � "·'  Consequently it was not, in fact, an effective staggered 
board because it could be repealed by a shareholder-approved bylaw. 
Given shareholders '  inherent power to adopt bylaws , 1-,  a bylaw stag­
gered board is no more entrenched than an unclassified board, 
\ IX 
564 A.2cl at 65 1 .  
1 4�1 !d. at 655 .  
1 :'" !d. at  654. 
��-� 5)1'1' id. at 654 ( " Blasius . . .  cle l iYer [ ecl] to Atlas a signed writ ten consent . . . . " ) . 
� .,_ Irl. at 652. 654. 
� .-.:, Irl. at 655. l 'ot 
!d. at 652 ,  655. 
1 ,, ., !d. at 66 1 -62. 
1-,, ;  ;\1;\l Cos. \ .  Liguid Auclio,  Inc. ,  8 l ;) A . 2 cl 1 1 1 8 , 1 1 22 ( De l .  2003 ) .  
1.,., !d. a t  1 1 22 .  
1-,, D E L.  CCJDL-\:\:\ t i t .  8 ,  � 1 09 (a)  ( 200 1 ) .  
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except insofar as th e corp oration 's  charter requires a supermaj o ri ty to 
amend the bylaws ( as -v as the case in Liquid Audio) . 1 '· ' '  The bylaw can 
be repealed at any time shareholders can act, which means that the 
shareholders can eliminate it at  the next annual meeting and then re­
place the directors with dire c tors willing to redeem the poison pill .  
vVhile Blasius i nvolved an effective staggered board that failed because 
of board inaction,  Liquid Audio involved a board that by design was a 
less than ful ly effe c tive s taggered board. 
In  Liquid Audio, the board had five members, two of whom were 
up for election . 1 .;1 1  M M ,  the bidder, launched a proxy fight:  i t  n omi­
nated two candidates to fill the upcoming vacancies; proposed a bylaw 
amendmen t to increase the size of the board by four; and nomin ated 
four candidates for those new slots . 1 1; 1 In  response , Liquid Audio's  
board amended the bylaws to expand the board by two to seve n .  In  
the election that followed, M M  won two seats on the board, b u t  i ts by­
law proposal failed to receive the two-thirds vote required.  Had i t  suc­
ceeded, M M  would have controlled six seats of an e leven-person 
board , thereby giving it control of the company. vVh en asked in a pre­
trial in terrogatory why it had expanded the board, Liquid Audio an­
swered that it was concerned that the potentially "acrimonious" rela­
tionship between MM's  board members and Liquid Audi o ' s  i ncum­
ben ts would lead one or more of the incumbent directors to resign, 
thereby causing a board deadlock or transferring control to M M .  
I n  giving this answer, Liquid Audio conceded that i t  had ex­
panded the board in order to dilu te MNI ' s  infl uence. 1 1;� Vice Chancel-
1m· Jacobs denied M M ' s  motion because h e  found that the board' s  ac­
tion did not m ake it harder for MM to obtain con trol : both under the 
initial and under the expanded size, MM would need the support of 
two-thirds of the shares to obtain control; in either case , support by a 
pl urality of the shares would give M M  minori ty representation on the 
board, but n o t  control. 1 ' ; : The Delaware Supreme Court did n o t  dis­
pute these facts,  but nevertheless held that the expansion of the board 
from five to seven was improper under Blasius: 
The record reflects that  the pri mal'! purp ose of th e D i rector D e fe n­
dants ·  act ion was to in terfere wi th and i mpede the effec ti\·e exercise of 
the s to c kholder franchise in a contested election for d irecto rs . . . .  That 
- -- -- --· -----
u• Tr<mscript a t  5-G. \L'vl Cos. \·. Liquid Audio.  Inc .  ( \io. 1 SJ .869 ) .  
� � .� �  r · . , _. , . S I C) ' t) J ·  J J 99 .lfjllli , l lU 10, c :> n. - C <lt - � -l id 
!d. at J l  �3.  
, ,;� Jd. at 1 1  �:)-2(:). 
1 '"' !d. at 1 1 1 1 .  
• 
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clefensi\·e action bv the D i re c to r  Defe ndants com prom ised the essen tial 
role of co rporate de mocracy in m a i n taining the p rope r al l ocation of 
powe r be tween the share holders an d the Board , because that action \\ as 
taken in the con text of a con tested election fo r successor di rec tors .  
S ince t h e  D i rector D e fendants did n o t  demonstrate a compcl l i n g j u-; tifi­
c ation for that defe nsive action , the bylaw amendme n t  that expanded 
th e size o f  the Liquid Audio board, and p em1 i t ted the appo i n tm e n t  of 
two new m embers o n  the eve of a contested election, sh oul d haYe been 
i m al iclated by the Court of Chancery.
1 1' 1  
\rVe believe that the Delaware Supreme Court was correct to apply 
Blasius even though the expansion of the board from five to seven did 
not make it harder for MM to obtain control . The chancery court 
analysis impli ci tly \iewed the in cumbent directors (and the l\I M repre­
sentatives) as h omogeneous groups: if each group member always 
vo tes ·with her group,  then the only importan t fac tor is the difficulty 
each group faces in getting a board maj ority. The supreme court's 
holding, bv contrast, is based on vievving each director as an individ­
ual .  If some of the incumbent directors may vote , on some issues , with 
the MM represen tatives-because they may be convinced by their ar­
guments-th en it is significan t wh ether the MM represen tatives oc­
cupy two of tlve or two of seven seats on the board . 
vVe think that the supreme court 's  holding is more i n  tune wi th 
the modern aspi ration for the board and with the actual composition 
of Liquid Audio ' s  board .  As we have argued elsewhere, the number 
and influence of independen t directors, who are un affil iated with 
management,  has grown signifi can tly in the last  decade. 1 1'�· Both Dela­
ware law and new federal regulati ons place increased emphasis on th e 
n umber and power of independen t directors. One premise for these 
laws is that independent directors are capable of exercising their own 
business j udgment, rather than blindly fol lm,ing the commands of 
management. The directors of Liquid Audio certainly tlt that picture. 
Of th e th ree directors whose seat<; were not contested, one (\Ninblad) 
j ust  recently had voted against a defensive merger proposed by man­
agement.  
A more in teresting case would have been presen ted had Liquid 
Audio given a more neutral response to the in terrogatory . 1 '; , , For 
1 ' "  /rl. a t l l 32 .  
-- ·-- · - · -- - ·-- -· -·- · ·----·--- ··--·-
, , ; -, StP h<than & Rock, sujHa n me - B ,  at 897 ( stating that  independe n t  d i rectors are 
pla\·i ng a gre a te r rol e  in  publ ic  corporations) . 
1 ' ''' LiC]uicl Audio ·s true motiYat ions may ha,·e been eYen worse than conceded. 
D i rector Win h lacl had oppose d the merger with Al liance.  as did :V! \1 .  Wi th tlw nw 
new \! \l directors. and \Yinhl<td continuing on the board ,  t h e re would h:m: been a :)-� 
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example ,  suppose that Liquid Audi o ' s  sole explanation for expanding 
the board was that it  needed additional independent directors i n  or­
der to fulfill all of the duties imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 , 1 ,;7 related SEC rules, and changes in stock exchange l isting re­
quirements .  
Here we get to the purer case:  a bylaw-cl assified board that has 
been poorly implemented.  If one takes the bylaw/charter distinction 
seriously, as Delaware does, then one could argue th at a classified 
board established by bylaw is  designed only for the sake of conven­
ience ( electing only a third of the directo rs each year) without en­
trenching th e board , v.rhi le  a board c lassified by charter can b e  under­
stood to do both. 
If  this is  the proper understanding of a bylaw-classified board, 
then,  even if we set aside the problematic i n terrogatory answer,  Liquid 
Audio can be understood to be a case in wh ich the board' s  defensive 
actions ·went beyond the degree of entrenchment opted for in the 
governance s tructure . That i s ,  the board ' s  actions went beyond 
merely correcting slop py implementation to an attempt to dil u te the 
infl uence of the challengers . The board expanded i ts size by tvvo and 
placed both new directors in classes that would not come up for elec­
tion at the next annual meeting. 1 ''� I n  doing so, i t  reduced the percent­
age of directors elected i n  the upcoming election from 40 % to 29 % .  
Notably, had the board expanded its size by three ,  the percentage of 
directors up for election would have dropped only to 38 % .  It  thus 
seems that the board action was purposefully designed to minimize 
the percen tage representation of the newly elected directors. From 
this perspective , the outcome in Liquid Audio would still be correct. � t •�· 
By contrast, Blasius is more troubling because i t  is a case in which 
the board 's  defensive actions conformed precisely to the degree of en­
trenchment opted for in the charter (albeit  a bit tardi ly) . To j us tify 
Blasius on this analysis, one needs an addi tional "better n ever than 
late " argument based on the sancti ty of the election period. One 
majority <lga inst  t h e  merger. \Vi t h  an expansion of t h e  hoard to 7 .  th ere would st i l l  be 
�� -t-::\ majori tv in famr. 




' 8 1 3  .'\ .2cl a t  1 1 24. 
1 "�' T h e re is  a potential  complicati o n .  In Liquid A udio, the bidder did not seek to 
repeal the stagge red board by a shareholcler-aclop ted bvlaw, but  ra t h e r  to e\·ade i ts 
strictures by expanding th e board and fi l l ing the Yacancies.  Because both tac tics are 
eq ualh diffi c u l t  to impleme n t  and yield the same effe c t  ( i . e . ,  one needs the same ! eYe! 
of shareholder support at the a n n ual meeting as does t l 1 e  other) , we clo n o t  ,·iew th i s  as 
a s ignific1nt dis t inction.  
.... . 
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needs to argue that even though the shareholders opted for a charter­
staggered board, and even though the directors undermined the 
shareholders ' commitment by fail ing to appoint a sufficient number 
of directors to make the choice effective , the directors cannot redress 
their mistake once the choice actually matters, that is, once a contest 
c 1 b . 1 70 10r contro egn1s. 
The lesson of these cases is that the board's defensive actions must 
be understood in the context of the governance s tructure adopted by 
the firm . vVhen a firm opts for an effective staggered board, as in Bla­
sius, the courts should respec t  that choice and a good-faith ( albeit  
tardy) board attempt to implement that structure is deserving of 
greater deference than h ad the firm opted for lesser entrenchment,  as 
in Liquid A udio. When a board attempts to confer greater entrench­
ment than provided for in the firm 's governance s tructure, that act 
should be subj ect to heightened scrutiny. 
Prospectively, of course , the lesson of Blasius and Liquid Audio for 
corporate counsel is clear: make sure that enough of the permitted 
seats are filled to prevent an end run through board expansion.  If  
most counsel drew this obvious l esson from the cases,  then i t  matters 
l ittle for firms with staggered boards whether Blasius and Liquid Audio 
·were righ tly decided. 
B. Surprises 
vVe now move to a second, related issue.  vVhat is the court's role 
when a provision that has been adopted dming one period, in a spe­
cific con text, later turns out to have different and unexpec ted effects? 
vVhat about surprises? 
Surprises constitute a generic problem inherent in any syste m  in 
which one can make in tertemporal or consti tutional commitments .  
Ex an te , any system that permits entrenchment o f  provisions wil l  pre­
dictably give 1ise to future complications , because provisions have un­
antici pated effects .  I n  addi tion , staleness and rigidity are inevi table 
side effects of entrenchment. No one should be surprised that there 
- - - - --·--- ----- -- ---
1 ;" In  the absence of title 8, section l 02 (b )  ( 7) of the De laware Code, these cases 
would pose an additional issue. As discussed abO\·e, there is substantial evidence that 
board entrenchment leads to h igher premia in deals that are completed. Supra text 
accompanving notes 1 2 6-30. v\'hen, th rough board negl igence. a charter-based s tag­
gered board is rendered ineffective, could shareholders seek damages, argui ng that 
the di rectors breached their duty of care and that, but for their negl igence, the pre­
mium would have been higher) 
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are surpnses ( although the parti cular surpnse will likely be surpns­
ing) . 
The recent history of Delaware corporate law includes qui te a few 
such surprises.  Thus, for example,  section 228 of the Delaware Gen­
eral Corporation Law ( D CCL) was amended in 1 969 to permit all 
shareholder action to be taken by written consent unless the charter 
provides otherwise. 1 7 1  'Wi th the rise of hosti le takeovers, this secti on 
became unexpectedly importan t because i t  made i t  easier for h ostile 
bidders to use consents to rem ove recalci trant incumbent directors 
between annual meetings and to elect a nevv board to disman tle the 
target 's  takeover defenses. 
So there are s urprises. Because the fact that there wil l  be surprises 
is en tirely predictable,  parties can and presumably do fac tor this pos­
sibility into their decision whe ther to en trench provisions. I n deed, 
many critical governance mechan isms are not en trenched or only 
1 -,, modestly so. '- And many firms do not entrench board veto but ac-
cord shareholders the power to remove the whole board, wi thout 
cause, between annual meetings should the board not do their bid­
ding in responding to a takeover bid. vVhen , as here ,  th e pote ntial 
downside of en trenchment is obvious,  the choice to entren ch a p rovi­
sion should be at l east prima facie  evidence that the expecte d  benefi t  
o f  the resulting commitment outweighs the expected losses from 
commitments that backfire.  
Furthermore, as described earlier, companies that comm i t  to 
some degree of board veto do not do so irreversibly: a firm can 
amend its certificate of i ncorporation to remove a staggered board or 
to enable shareholders to rem ove direc tors at any ti me wi thout 
cause . 1 7:: Note how Delaware law permits flexibility without  destroying 
the possibility of robust precommitment.  In contrast to bylaws , n ei­
th er the shareholders alone n o r  the board alone can chan ge the char­
ter-each has a ve to .  Consider how i t  works. If  the classified board 
and the shareh olders both wish to accept an offer, then a friendly deal 
is negotiated. If both prefer to turn down a bid ,  the shareh olders '  
1 7 1 
DEL Com: A:\ :\ .  t i t .  8 ,  � 228 ( 200 1 ) . Prior to the amendment, the ch a rter e:o;.­
p l i c i tly had to authorize acti o n  bv wri tten consent.  
1 7� For example,  the presence o r  absence of a c o n troll i n g  shareholder; the se lec­
tion a n d  composi tion of the board; the relationsh ip be tween the board a n d  t h e  CEO, 
i n c l uding the e\·a l uation a n d  replacement o f  the CEO; th e selec tion of a new CEO: the 
relationship between the CEO a n d  the other executive employees. 1 7 1  
The poss i b i l i ty of such amendments is  n o t  purelv theore tical . For example,  
['vl i c h aels Stores e l i m i nated i ts s taggered board in 200 1 .  Michaels Stores Prow State­
m e n t  8 ( Ma\' 6, 2003) , h t�p:/ /mnuec. gm .  
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p recommitment is not triggered. If, ex post, shareholders prefer to 
accept the bid but the board , for whatever reason (whether because 
the board is pro-shareholder or because i t  hopes to maintain control ) 
opposes it ,  the precommitment to board power holds because share­
h olders cannot amend the charter without a board recommenda­
tion. ' ' '  Bidders, then,  will have no choice but to negotiate vvi th the 
board if they wish to avoid th e on e-year-plus delay _ , ,,-, 
Beyond such measures for limiting or modifying commitments ,  
should shareholders wan t j udges t o  intervene o n  a case-by-case basis to 
bail them out of commitments that have backfired? Recall the under­
lying problem: a precommitment is only as strong as the obstacles to 
subsequent reversal . Odysseus 's  precommitment strategy that allowed 
him to experience the Sirens ' song req uired that he preven t  himself 
from renegotiating terms ex pose ' ''; It was not enough simply to h ave 
his sailors tie him to the mast; he also needed them to stop up their 
ears with wax both to protect th em from the Sirens' call  and so that 
they could not hear and obey his countermanding order. 1 77 Thus, if 
there is to be ju dicial intervention, it  m us t  be highly selective: o ther­
\vise , the attempt to rescue shareholders ex post ,>\Till destroy the value 
of the commitment ex ante. 
The desirability of j udicial bailouts turns on whether co urts can 
distinguish be tw·een com mitments that work as intended and com­
mitments that have backfire d . ' '� One approach is that of Schnell v. 
1 7 �  And ,·i ce ' e rsa: if the board desires to sel l ,  but shareholders are opposed, they 
can vote clown a merger. 
1 7·, And note ,  further,  how the veto power allows the same charter to be used to 
make credible commitments to other groups such as preferred s tockhol ders .  By put­
ting t h e  terms of preferred s to c k  i n to the charter,  changing those terms requires a 
class-wide vote and thu,- c rea tes a specific bilateral  veto. 
1 7 ' ;  Hm!ER, TI I E ODY'iSFY � H)-47 ,  bk. 1 2 , lL 5 7-6 7 (J'N. :'vlackail trans. ,  Oxford Uni­
' ersi t\' Press 1 9:\�) . 
1 77 !d. 
' '' 
:\ot all legal i n tetYe n tions consti tute commitment bailouts .  Sometimes, a new 
Ia"· or docrxine is  needed to cla d-\· an ambiguit\' or to address a novel issue. At other 
times, the law may be modi fi ed to expand the a\·ailable choices. The adoption of title 
8,  section l0:2 (h)  (7 )  of the Del<n,·are Code, wh ich permits charter amendments to opt 
o u t  of moneta rY l iabil it\ fo r breaches of the duty of care, fal ls in the latter categorv. 
DEL CODE A'\'\. tiL 8. � t m (h) ( 7 )  (20(H ) .  hen choice-enhancing legal inte rventions, 
howeYer, have a secondarY impact o n  commitmen ts. A .. rguably, Delaware law as it ex­
isted before the adop tion of section 1 0� ( b )  ( 7 )  entrenched a commitment not to opt 
out of monetan· l iabi l i ty for breaches of fiduciary duty. More l ikely, however, such law 
reflec ted a wide understanding that no monetary l iabil i ty would be imposed for 
breaches of the d u ty or care-an un derstandi ng that was shaken by Sm ith v. Van 
Gmlw 111. 4ii8 A.2cl H:'JK (DeL 1 985 ) .  
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Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. , 1 7
, 1 namely, to use fiduciary duty law to carve 
out an opportunity for j udicial action when the board is acting purely 
for bad reasons such as entrenchment. 1 80 Thus, in Schnell, the court 
held that the directors could not advance the date of the stockholders 
meeting, even though permitted by the bylaws to do so, when they 
were doing so for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate efforts of 
dissident shareholders to conduct a proxy contest. 1 s 1  
For courts to go even further in rewriting precommitments, they 
would have to be able to distinguish between real examples of pre­
commitment misfiring and examples of precommitment binding as 
intended. In both cases, shareholders will knock at the courthouse 
door asking to be let out of their bargains. The external manifesta­
tions will be similar. If the court's error rate is high, allmving the 
courts to try to distinguish cases in which bailouts are warranted will 
tend to undermine the very possibility of precommitment. 
Is the poison pill the sort of unhappy surprise that has caused a 
commitment, represented by a staggered board provision, to backfire 
and that might j ustify a j udicial bailout? Several commentators have 
suggested that in the pre-pill  days when most staggered boards were 
adopted, they were a rather ineffective antitakeover device. 1 s� Raiders 
would just consummate the tender offer, and a board, faced with in­
evitable ultimate ouster, would cave in and resign. But with the emer­
gence of the poison pill, the story goes, staggered boards became 
more potent than the enacting shareholders anticipated. 1 s:\ vVhile in 
place, the pill prevents the consummation of a hostile tender offer. 
The staggered board, in turn, obstructs the main way to get around 
the pill-a proxy contest-because it takes two consecutive proxy con­
tests to replace a board majority and requires shareholders to elect a 
raider's nominees without assurance that the company will be taken 
1 7!1 
283 A.2d 852 ( Del .  Ch.  1 97 1 ) .  
�. ,o !d. at 855. ! H I  
!d. a t  854. 
��� See BC&S, supm note 6 at 899 ( " [A] staggered board without a pill is . . .  ineffec­
tive against a bid, given the unlikelihood that target directors \viii  continue to resist if a 
bidder has acquired a majori ty of the target's stock.") ; Black & Kraakman, supra n o te 6 ,  
at 562 (same ) ; Gilson, sujna note 6, at 78 1 -82 (same) .  
1 ":' See BC&S supra note 6, at 903-25 ( arguing that emergence of the poison pil l  
made staggered boards more potent than anticipated) ; Black & Kraakman,  supm n o te 
6, at 562 (arguing that the pi l l  does not al low shareholders to vote on the board's deci­
sion to reject a takeover bid) ; see also Robert B. Thompson & D .  Gordon S m i th ,  Toward 
a Nnu Theol)' of the Shareholder Role: "Sacred Space " in CmjJorale Takeovers, 80 TE�. L. REv. 
26 1 ,  305 ( 200 1 ) ( noting that the pi l l  makes a hostile takeover prohibi tively expensive 
for poten tial acq uirers ) .  
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over shortly. Although , i t  i s  argued, the pill/ staggered board combi­
nation is more potent than curren t shareholders desire, 1 �4 few boards 
give shareholders the opportunity to vote on charter amendments to 
de-classify the board . Courts should assist shareholders ,  these com­
mentators argue ,  by forcing a board to redeem the pill  once i t  has lost 
an initial proxy context. 1 �'' The case for legal interven tion is arguably 
s trengthened by the fac t  that D el aware courts are only asked to clean 
up the problem that they themselves created by j udicially sanctioning 
the innovative poison pill defense: 1 s1; had they never sanc tioned the 
pill ,  the s taggered board would only h ave the milder effect that was 
anticipated, and no j udicial intervention would be needed now. 
vVe think that this  s tory unders tates the significance of s taggered 
boards in pre-pill days. Staggered boards have always served as an en­
trenchment device against con trol changes that, ex post, were op­
posed by the board but favored by a maj ority of shareholders. Before 
the advent  of the pill ,  neither the SEC nor commentators though t that 
I S-Staggered boards were toothless . ' '  On the con trary, s taggered boards 
have always been viewed as making it substan tially more difficult to 
replace the board in a proxy contest. As a commentator noted in 
1 955:  
I n  recen t  years, t h e  n umber o f  corporations havi ng c lassified direc tors 
has i n c reased, perhaps because of the increasing number of contests for 
con trol of corporations. Obvi ously , classification m akes i t  h arder to 
chan ge m anagement and m akes it p robable that management  cannot be 
changed u n ti l  after at  least  two annual  meeti ngs o f  stockholders ,  u n less 
some of the incumbent directors side with th ose seek ing con tro l .  Insur­
ge n t  stockholders must secure the vote of a m aj ority of the stock repre­
se nted at two or more ann ual meeti ngs i n  o rder to effectuate control ,  
lx< See Black & Kraakman ,  supra note 6,  at 560 ("Shareholders . . .  cannot unilater­
ally accept or reject a takeover bid. They m ust wai t for the board to act . . . .  ") .  
Jx ', Sr'e BC&S, supra note 6 ,  at 944 (arguing that courts should not allow managers 
to block a takeover bid after having lost an election on an acquisition offer) ; Black & 
Kraakman, supra note 6, at 56 !  (same) ; Gilson, sujJra note 6, at 807- 1 8  (same) ; sef' also 
Thompson & Smith, sujna note 1 83, at 3 1 5- 1 9  (describing the 'just say no" defense 
under Delaware law) . 
1"'  \:Ve h ave addressed this point previously. See Kahan & Rock, suj;m note 43, at 
909- l l .  
l x> See Disclosure in Proxy and Information Statements; Anti-Takeover or Similar 
Proposals, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1 5 ,230, [ 1 978 Transfer Binder] 
Feel. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) � 8 1 ,748, at Attachment A (Oct. 1 3, 1 978) ( permitting classi­
fied boards as defensive charter provisions) ; Leonard D. Adkins,  Cmpomte DPmocracy 
and Classified Direct on, 1 1  Bcs. LA 'v\'. 3 1 ,  32 ( 1 955)  ( noting that classi fi cation creates 
obstacles for insurgent stockholders) . 
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which ,  of course , materially inc reases the cost  of the pro).; fights m -• \ SS volvecl a nd may well tend to discourage an auack. · '  
vVhen hostile control con tests were primarily waged by proxy bat­
tles ,  the entrenching effect  of a staggered board was identi cal to th e 
effect today of a staggered board with a poison pill ·when h osti le ten­
der offers are used. In both cases, the bidder h as to wai t a bit  longer 
'--
than a year, or reach a deal with the board. vVhi le  stockh olders in ear-
lier decades who supported board classification may n o t  h ave an tici­
pated that the poison pill would be invented later, they did choose to 
codify one of the strongest defensive measures that was available to 
their direc tors at that tim e .  And even when hostile tender offers be­
came the dominant mode for effecting control changes, the notion 
that bidders consummate the tender offer and hope for the board to 
resign strikes us as divorced from reality. 1s·• It is far from clear that any 
bidder would be vvill ing (or that any lender would permit a bidder) to 
spend huge amounts of money to buy stock with a h ostile board stil l  i n  
control . 1 , 10 
This being said,  i t  is correct that a staggered board combined with 
a pill is a stronger barrier  than a staggered board without a pill .  
Adoption of a staggered board i n  the pre-pi l l , post-proxv contest days 
may thus reflect a desire for a moderate degree of en trenchment, 
where a staggered board by i tself is ':j ust righ t," but a staggered board 
with a pill (or neither a staggered board nor a pill)  is too cold or too 
hot .  The validation of a pill ,  in other words , is indeed one of these 
expected, unexpected surprises.  But does that provide a case for le­
gally neutralizing the entrenchment effect of staggered boards? 
It is hard to con ceive of a j udicially crafted rule that would treat 
companies that adopted staggered boards in the pre-pill era differ­
ently from those that adopted them in the post-pill era. As to compa­
nies that went public or adopted staggered boards during the post-pill 
era, there is obviously no argument for changing the rules based on 
1 �H  
Adkins, sHjJra note 1 87 ,  at 31 , 32 .  
1 "'' Telephone Conversation wi th  /\.nhur Fleischer, Jr . .  Senior Partner, Fried,  
Frank, Harris ,  Shriver & Jacobson (2002) _ 1�111 
To be sure,  when faced wi th a hostile b id that  h as obtained shareholder sup­
port, a company wi th a staggered board m ay decide n o t  lO tigh t i t  out.  Rather, the 
board wil l  t ry to negotiate the terms of surrender. This,  of course, remains t rue toclav 
for most companies with staggered boards and poison pills ,  as illustrated by the smal l  
number o f  failed hostile bids. Si''' supra text accompanving notes l � l -25 (nuting a l ow 
fai lure rate of hostile bids invoh·ing companies wi th staggered boards) _ 
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changed circumstances. 1 ! 1 1 But  even wi th respect  to firms that adopted 
staggered boards in the pre-pil l  era, the case for j udicial intervention 
to render staggered boards impotent is ambiguous. If  the percentage 
of post-pil l  IPO companies with staggered boards is an approximate 
measure of the overall percentage for which staggered boards plus 
pills are advisable ,  that combination would be appropriate for many 
companies that adopted a staggered board before the advent of the 
pil l .  Moreover, there is evidence that adaptive devices-independent 
directors and stock options,  in particular-have greatly reduced the 
extent to ·which pills are used for pernicious purposes. 1 ' '� Thus, there 
is no sufficient basis for a wholesale j udicial neutralization of the en­
trenchment effect of the staggered board combined with a poison 
pil l .  I ' ! <  
CONCLUSION 
Constitutions consti tu te a polity and create and entrench power. 
A corporate consti tu tion-the governance choices incorporated in 
state law and the certificate of incorporation-resembles a political 
constitution. Delaware law allows parties to create corporations ,  to 
endow them with perpetual life ,  to assign rights J.nd duties to "citi­
zens" (directors and shareholders) . to adopt structures of governance, 
and to entrench those s tructures .  
> !> I This does not  mean that courts should ign o re a shareholder vote to replace a 
third of a staggered board . . ;\s we h aYe disc ussed in an earl ie r  article ,  such a vote may 
wel l  bear on the j udicial  appli cation of the Unocal test. Sel' Kahan & Rock, supra n o te 
43,  at 9 1 1 - 1 5 ( a rgui n g  that the shareholder I"O te shoul d  be a factor i n  the court 's  en­
hanced scrutinv review of a board ' s  decision to 'just say no" ) .  
I'':! s·"�' P. g. ,  id. a t  887-Y9 ( argu i n g  th at  the poison p i l l-a poten tially pernicious 
tool-did n o t  ac tually yield the expected e ffects ) . 
I ' '" A s tronger case could be made for legisbti\·e bai lout .  A l egislati\·e response 
could he tai l o red to minim ize the extern to \vh i c h  it would undermine c o m m i tments 
that were worki ng as a n ti c i pated.  First, a legislative bail o u t  could be co n fi n e d  to com­
pan ies th at ha1·e adopted staggered boards i n  the p re-p i l l  era. Second, it could be 
s tructured in such a way as to reduce transaction costs and minimize the l oss of com­
m i tmen t val ue fur the compan ies that have adopted a staggered board p re-pil l  and 
"·ant  to retain the commi tmen t embedded in it. For example ,  a s tatute could requi re 
that companies ,,·i th p re-pi l l  swggered bo�1rds propose a chart e r  amendme n t  to repeal 
the staggered board ,,· ithin th ree years after shareholder s  <ldopt  a reso l u tion cal l i n g  for 
such an amenclme n L  Such a regime would im pose costs associate d  ,,·ith a charter 
amendmen t  only on select pre-p i l l  companies.  Morem·e r, as the board wou l d  choose 
the t iming of the WJte on the staggered board, the vote would he c o nducted mmide 
the context of a specific acquisition offer and t h us ref1ect a choice on whe t h e r  to en­
trench hoard power, rathe r  than on whether to adopt a specific acq uisit ion offe r .  
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In this Article ,  we have argued th at the decision to endmv direc­
tors with significan t power over acquisitions is a consti tu tional choice 
of governance structure. We then argued that i t  is ,  on theoretical and 
empirical grounds, a perfectly intelligible choice: shareholders rea­
sonably might opt for board veto in order to enable a board to employ 
selling strategies more effectively and thus increase the p remium 
shareholders receive whe n  the company is sold. Such a decision is a 
kind of precommitment whereby shareholders ,  by binding themselves 
ex ante ,  may be able to improve their collective posi tion ex post.  
Once one understands the nature of sh areholders ' intertemporal 
choice, and why shareholders migh t  plausibly opt for i t, i t  should not 
be surprising if cases arise in which the precommitmen ts bind,  and 
shareholders, ex post, migh t wish to be relieved of the consequences 
of their choice. That is the necessary consequence, and indeed the 
very purpose, of a precommitment. A court's excessive willingness, ex 
post, to rewrite the bargain to relieve a party on the grounds of "sur­
prise" undermines the p ossibility of precommitment ex an te .  
